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Qualifying Operation OVERLORD Experts
An Infantry School Initiative

Albert H. Smith, Jr.

This article has two distinct, but interrelated parts—closely following General Smith's OVERLORD educational program. The first deals with the initial concept for the program and its beginnings at Fort Benning, Georgia (see the Project Chronology at the end of the first segment). The second part deals with the Normandy staff ride in France.

My interest in Operation OVERLORD and the Allied amphibious and airborne assaults into Normandy, France, goes back to 6 June 1944, when I landed on OMAHA Beach at 0720. That D-day experience triggered forty-nine years of personal research and study that continue to this day. For the past ten years I have served as an unpaid volunteer consultant on Operation OVERLORD to the Army's chiefs of staff and other senior commanders. Most recently, it has been a special pleasure to advise and assist Lt. Gen. Claude M. Kicklighter, U.S.A. (Ret.) executive director of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II commemoration committee.

From the outset, military planners recognized the importance of telling the story of D-day again and again. Until the servicemen and women of today are made aware of the great 1944 Allied victory in Normandy, the fiftieth anniversary of World War II cannot be considered complete.

Hoping to do my part to pass along the legacy of D-day, I spent many hours exploring possible courses of action. Finally, more dream than reality, a promising partial solution emerged: I would take a hand in qualifying a dozen outstanding Army instructors as Operation OVERLORD experts. They in turn would be available to tell our soldiers, in addition to many other audiences, why one should honor our World War II predecessors who fought so well and achieved so much a half-century ago.

I chose the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, as the best location to conduct a year-long Operation OVERLORD professional development program. The excellent facilities were familiar to me; there would be a large cadre of exceptional officer instructors; and, most important, the commandant, Maj. Gen. Jerry A. White, knew and trusted me. I made a written proposal from my home in Tucson, Arizona, on 30 May 1992, and General White accepted with enthusiasm on 5 June.

As a D-day survivor and eyewitness and former Infantry School instructor, I was ideally suited for my role as senior teacher and mentor. I also served as a consultant to General White on all program matters, and, once we arrived on the ground in France, I added the role of staff ride leader.

We decided to ask for volunteers, since there would be many hours of off-duty readings, research, and preparation. Advanced course instructors were chosen over other faculty members because, once OVERLORD qualified, they would be in the best position to share their expertise.

During our first discussion General White recognized the need for a senior faculty counterpart with whom I could discuss plans, requirements, and problems on a regular basis. Accordingly, he designated Col. Stephen Nash, director of the Combined Arms and Tactics Department, to assist in getting the OVERLORD project off the ground. Several months later, when Colonel Nash's travel commitments (TDY) increasingly kept him away from Fort Benning, Col. Craiger Parker, the deputy assistant commandant, began to work with me. This was a great arrangement, because from that moment on Colonel Parker was able to provide close, continuing, enthusiastic support for every phase of our endeavor.

By design, our educational initiative was an orchestrated change-of-pace program. In the beginning, there was a general introduction to the subject. Then, a month before our October seminar, each team's research was focused on a different battle area. The findings subsequently were shared with all participants during October seminar presentations.

November and December 1992 found each participant tackling an expanded reading list, trying to learn all there was to know about the subject. My letter of 2 January 1993 confirmed that general approach by requiring each team to prepare an OVERLORD lecture covering the total subject. This proved to be another timely change in direction that produced outstanding team presentations during our March 1993 seminar.

Starting with our May seminar, we returned to specialization, and this approach carried through our Normandy staff ride. Each team was reassigned its original area of expertise and required to prepare appropriate battlefield presentations. For example, in October Team 6 had shared with us its considerable knowledge of OMAHA Beach and Pointe du Hoc. Moving on to France, the team continued to instruct us all on the fierce D-day fighting from vantage points overlooking sand and surf.

Project Chronology, June 1992-June 1993

23 June. My letter to Col. Steve Nash, director of the Combined Arms and Tactics Department, results in the selection of twelve volunteers and their organization into six two-man teams.

20 July. My first formal letter to each program participant provides guidance and study assignments for the next three weeks.

24 July. In response to our request, Brig. Gen. Harold Nelson, the Chief of Military History, provides basic Center of Military History publications on OMAHA Beachhead, UTAH Beach, and Pointe du Hoc for detailed study by each volunteer.

14 September. Our letter assigns specific presentations to be made by the six teams on Monday, 19 October, and Tuesday, 20 October.

13 October. General White sends letters to General Gordon R. Sullivan, General Frederick Franks, Jr., General David M. Maddox, General John Shalikashvili, and Lt. Gen. Claude Kicklighter, informing them of our demanding program of instruction and its capstone: the planned Normandy staff ride.

19-20 October. Six seminar sessions are conducted by the six teams.

21 October. A three-hour planning session results in project guidance through December 1992. Additional reading and study assignments are made and a new reference book list distributed.

2 January. Our letter announces team missions for the first three months of 1993, to include specific presentation requirements.

18 March. Our letter provides additional guidance for 29-30 March team presentations plus some tentative staff ride information.

Contents

29-30 March. During our seminar sessions, six Operation OVERLORD presentations were made and "murdered."

2-7 April. Two of our captains conduct advance reconnaissance missions in Normandy and look into travel arrangements from Atlanta, Georgia, to Paris, France.

2-4 May. During my third get-together with participants at Fort Benning, we review each team's planned instruction at the assigned Normandy battle locations. In a related World War II commemoration activity, Lt. Col. Albert N. Garland and I conduct two officer professional development classes on the 1943 Sicily campaign. Lessons learned during that invasion helped Allied forces during Operation OVERLORD.

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The scene was now set. What follows are my personal recollections of our staff ride to Normandy, 29 May-7 June 1993.

France, Saturday, 29 May. To beat the holiday traffic headed out of Paris for the beaches, Jean Centner (my Belgian friend) and I had an early breakfast and were on the road by 0800. Traveling through the outskirts of Paris was most enjoyable that quiet Saturday morning. We made good time, with no wrong turns, on our way to Bayeux.

We checked into the Luxembourg Hotel shortly after noon. After quickly unpacking, we headed to the Normandy Cemetery for a meeting with its superintendent, Phil Rivers. Getting together for the first time since 1989 was a most happy experience.

Phil briefed us on projected activities from Memorial Day, 30 May, through the forty-ninth anniversary of D-day, 6 June 1993. We discussed our group's participation, then headed for the west end of OMAHA Beach to locate the beginning of a new Boy Scouts of America historical trail. It runs just inland of the cliffs all the way to Pointe du Hoc.

We arrived back at the Luxembourg Hotel just as our twelve volunteer instructors from Fort Benning, along with their favorite French student, Capt. Olivier Coreau, were checking in. The self-styled "dirty dozen" had experienced heavy traffic from Orly Airport to Bayeux.

After a delicious dinner, we met to plan Sunday's Memorial Day ceremony, plus team reconnaissances from Pegasus Bridge on the east to Ste. Mere Eglise and UTAH Beach on the west. Understandably, everyone was completely exhausted as our first day's discussion ended.

Memorial Day, Sunday, 30 May. We arrived at the Normandy Cemetery about 0945, in time for Phil Rivers

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to walk us through our part of the Memorial Day observance. That brief, dignified ceremony in the Rotunda Memorial began minutes later with the placing of floral tributes. Then, with appropriate recorded music including Taps, all present saluted those who had fought and died on D-day beaches and drop zones. At Phil's request (and on behalf of the American Battle Monuments Commission), I spoke for about ten minutes, recounting the history of Decoration Day (starting in 1866) and explaining why our Infantry School group was conducting its Normandy staff ride. Jean Centner translated my remarks for French visitors in the audience. The weather was overcast, cool, and windy—very close of the conditions American soldiers experienced on 6 June 1944.

The First Division Museum in Wheaton, Illinois, provided funds to purchase four floral tributes for 30 May and the same number for 6 June. In each instance our group placed the largest piece at the Rotunda Memorial and the others (one each) at the 1st Infantry Division Monument, Teddy Roosevelt's grave, and Jimmie Monteith's grave. Immediately after the last of these ceremonies, our six teams and Captain Coreau departed to reconnoiter their assigned battle areas.

Jean and I headed for Port-en-Bessin. We toured this picturesque fishing village before visiting the nearby Musee des Epaves, a small outdoor-indoor museum featuring large and small military items salvaged from the English Channel following World War II. For example, we found two 741st Tank Battalion Duplex Drive (DD) Sherman tanks that foundered before reaching OMAHA Beach.

Our six teams returned from their treks just in time for dinner—full of mostly good experiences.

Monday, 31 May. We departed Bayeux for the most distant British assault areas at 0900, and our staff ride instruction began an hour later at Pegasus Bridge. Maj. Johnnie E. Sweatte and Maj. Terry Earnest were fortunate indeed to locate two eyewitnesses who briefed us on their D-day experiences: a British veteran who crashed with Major Howard in glider no. 1 and the daughter of a nearby French cafe owner. Their vivid recollections and Team 5's comprehensive briefings got us off to a great start!

We next stopped at SWORD Beach (near Ouistreham) for briefings and vignettes on amphibious assaults by the British 3d Infantry Division, Hobert's armored "funnies," and the 4th Commando. Stimulated by top-notch instruction and sea breezes, we were more than ready for lunch.

Our group was remounted and on the road to Caen by 1400. We paused en route for a half-hour or so to explore an inland grouping of German strongpoints that slowed the 3d Division's advance south toward D-day objectives.

During the late afternoon we toured Caen's Battle of Normandy Museum, guided by a young American lady, Sara Berkey. Afterward, everyone took advantage of the best book, map, and postcard store in all of Normandy—the museum gift shop.

Back at the hotel around 1800, all agreed it had been a fine beginning for our staff ride. The weather was nearly perfect, the instruction was first class, and our group was becoming more enthusiastic by the minute.

Tuesday, 1 June. Departing the hotel at 0900, we arrived at GOLD Beach thirty minutes later. Team 1 (Maj. Todd M. Piester and Capt. Steven Russell) briefed us on amphibious assaults of the British 50th Infantry Division, plus actions of the 4th Commando. Their vignettes described individual deeds of incredible courage that expedited the advance inland. Terrain here was noticeably different from that of SWORD Beach.

Moving on to Arromanches, we received a most informative tour of the Landing Museum, with its operating model of "Port Winston," the artificial harbor which supported British forces from June through November 1944.

We lunched at several fast-food stands in the center of town, shopping at Jacques Ravelli's well-stocked OVERLORD Bookstore before and after eating. It is located immediately across from the museum's entrance.

Team 4 (Maj. Douglas A. Burrer and Capt. Dennis R. Linton) conducted our afternoon instruction at several locations, east and west of Courseulles. Their briefings covered assaults by the Canadian 3d Division against German defenses in the JUNO Beach area. Hearing these accounts while observing the terrain, our group clearly understood why Canadian units advanced so rapidly toward their deep D-day objectives.

Along the road back to Bayeux, we paused at Our Lady of the Waves observation point, the Longues-sur-Mer batteries, and the Musee des Epaves (salvage museum). Exploring each location broadened our appreciation of the 6 June 1944 battle.

Each day we were in Normandy Team 2 (Maj. Michael N. McManus and Capt. John K. Carothers) would provide expert commentary on the enemy at appropriate points. For example, they briefed us on the German counterattack between SWORD and JUNO Beaches that nearly reached the English Channel.

After dinner, on the way to our evening conference, we discovered Maj. Gen. (Ret.) George Patton III and his daughter in another section of our hotel dining room.

They were in France to finalize the dedication of a Normandy apple orchard to George Patton, Jr.'s, Third Army headquarters. It secretly displaced there from England before the 1 August breakout.

The highlight of the day was our after-dinner seminar with Guillaume Mercader, World War II French Resistance hero. As always, Jean Centner did a great job of translating French to English and vice versa.

Wednesday, 2 June. Team 3 (Maj. Edward G. Gibbons and Maj. John Murray) gave their initial briefing on 82d and 101st Airborne Division battles. From a vantage point along Highway N13, we were fascinated by the Lt. Turner B. Turnbull vignette. He and his understrength platoon stopped the German *91st Division*'s movement south for about eight hours.

Later that morning we visited the Airborne Museum located in Ste. Mere Eglise. The museum curator and an old friend, Phil Jutras, gave us a guided tour through two exhibit halls, one featuring a D-day glider and the second its pull plane, the C-47 Dakota.

In one display case I saw, for the first time, photographs of Brig. Gen. Teddy Roosevelt's 14 July 1944 funeral. All the senior American commanders in Normandy were present, including George Patton. Fortunately, he was able to keep his identity a secret from the press.

There are a number of good, small restaurants surrounding the town square, and we enjoyed Normandy pancakes for lunch at one of the best. Then it was off to Les Mesieres for the S. Sgt. Harrison Summers vignette. His heroic actions on D-day will inspire American warriors for generations to come. It was here also that Team 3 introduced us to the 4th Infantry Division's amphibious assaults.

UTAH Beach, our next stop, must be seen to be appreciated. It is so flat and open! Standing on the dunes amid highly vulnerable German defenses, we could visualize why Allied air and naval bombardments were so effective, and why American progress inland went so well.

Midway along the beach we were met by a well-dressed, dignified Frenchman, the mayor of Ste. Marie-du-Mont. He pointed out important battle sites and then escorted our group into the museums for a short movie of D-day actions. Following the film, Edge Gibbons presented his vignette on Brig. Gen. Teddy Roosevelt, Jr.

In retrospect, this was another really good day from beginning to end.

Thursday, 3 June. By design, our sixth day in France was a definite change of pace. We traveled inland and south of the beaches some twenty-three miles to Villers-Bocage and then on to Caumont. Team 2 briefed us on how a small German task force stopped the attack of the British 7th Armored Division, which had the mission of seizing Villers-Bocage, thereby expanding the Allied lodgment.

At high points along Highway N175, including its junction with Road D6 from Bayeux, we paused for instruction. Two lessons became apparent: first, a small enemy group making maximum use of commanding terrain and long-range cannon can inflict heavy losses on a much larger attacking force; second, the British 7th Armored Division did not execute a well-planned tank-infantry attack, supported by all available American and British artillery. Such a combined arms approach could have been successful.

Moving seven miles west from Villers-Bocage to Caumont, we spent an hour or so analyzing defensive terrain occupied by the 18th and 26th Infantry Regiments, 1st Infantry Division. These battle-tested units had raced south from OMAHA Beach to seize this important hilltop town on D-day plus seven. I pointed out the difficulty of defending the salient which had been created when British forces had not matched the American advance.

Just before noon we arrived at Huebner Village, a beautiful planned community of two dozen family homes on the outskirts of Caumont. Constructed as a prototype housing project by the French government, it was named in honor of Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner. Near the entrance, with American and French flags flying in a light breeze, we introduced ourselves to the mayor and town council, who joined us for a brief, warm ceremony. Capt. Olivier Coreau (our French student from Fort Benning) and I placed a lovely floral arrangement at the Huebner memorial plaque. A few laudatory words and military salutes honored one of the best combat commanders the U.S. Army has ever produced.

Then it was on to the Hotel de Ville for champagne and cookies. Incidentally, the mayor and town council were the same local officials who had hosted a 16th Infantry TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) back in July 1987. They remembered it well.

The mayor and I exchanged warm introductions that were translated by Jean Centner. Afterwards, we learned how Caumont fared, from the American arrival in June 1944 until the British breakout in late July. Farmers and townspeople had suffered major discomforts, plus a number of battle casualties from incoming German artillery fire.

Returning to our hotel, we took a different route through the Cerisy Forest, Trevieres, and Formigny. This tour across difficult terrain gave us a better appreciation

for June-July 1944 combat challenges. Once back in Bayeux, most of us enjoyed an afternoon of sightseeing and visiting the Bayeux Military Museum. Capt. Ronald T. Millis and Capt. Stephen G. Yackley (Team 6), however, were all business, heading back to OMAHA Beach for their final reconnaissance preparatory to Friday's instruction.

Friday, 4 June. Starting at 0930, Team 6 outlined our study program for the day and introduced us to key terrain features of OMAHA Beach. Their initial outdoor classroom—the overlook of the Normandy American Cemetery—was an ideal vantage point.

It was at this location, a few minutes later, that we met two senior instructors from St. Cyr, the French military academy. These acquaintances of Captain Coreau, along with a German military historian, were guiding fifty French cadets on a special tour of the Normandy battlefields. They moved westward, as we headed east for FOX RED and the F-1 draw.

During our first stop under the cliffs, we recalled a famous D-day photograph of Company L, 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, taking a short break before continuing the attack inland. Team 6 described landing problems and initial assaults against German beach defenses.

On the first high ground south of FOX RED and east of the F-1 draw, we explored enemy command bunkers and traced a trench system that provided local security. Here Team 6's presentation highlighted the heroic stand by 3d Battalion, 16th Infantry, survivors (mostly from Company L) on 6 June 1944. I commanded Company L during the Sicily campaign and, in all my OVERLORD lectures since 1983, have proudly described its D-day successes. It was only by retracing Company L's advance across OMAHA Beach, however, around the cliffs and up the bluffs, that I could fully appreciate what those few brave warriors accomplished, securing the left flank of the 1st Division beachhead.

Remounted again, we moved through the towns of Grand Hameau and Colleville to the 1st Infantry Division monument overlooking eastern beach defenses. From this point, one can look south and see Colleville about a mile inland and look north and west to most of OMAHA Beach. Team 6, having further oriented us on German defenses in the area, led the way down the bluffs to shingle and sand.

In our trek westward over the damp tidal flat, we paused midway between the E-3 and E-1 draws to identify routes taken by 2d Lt. John M. Spalding (Company E) and Capt. Joseph T. Dawson (Company G) in reaching high ground south of EASY RED. That visualization was easier than expected, since a permanent walkway now connects OMAHA Beach with the cemetery overlook. Climbing that steep, winding path, we essentially followed the route taken by most 1st Division soldiers on 6 June 1944.

Team 6 used Spalding and Dawson vignettes to illustrate how determined small units, led by courageous commanders, can breach tough enemy defenses.

During the afternoon, instruction focused on German defenses and American attacks between the E-1 and D-3 draws. We examined enemy bunkers and discussed American engineer D-day activities. I attempted to pinpoint General Huebner's D-day command post, but could determine only that it was somewhere up the D-1 draw, just short of St. Laurent's outer buildings.

Friday proved to be a most informative day, even for this old soldier. It is almost impossible to visualize the vastness, the openness of OMAHA Beach unless you are there. Stretching for more than three miles from east to west, it was an immense shooting gallery for German defenders on D-day. Conversely, it was a deathtrap for American soldiers who lingered too long on the sand and shingle. Col. George Taylor, commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, got his troops moving inland from EASY RED with a loud and clear order: "Two kinds of people are staying on this beach, the dead and those who are going to die. Now, let's get the hell out of here!" They did, as American warriors penetrated the beach defenses and headed south.

Saturday, 5 June. Team 6 began the day's instruction with a summary of assaults by the 116th Infantry Regiment. Also covered were operations of the 5th Ranger Battalion with its attached companies from the 2d Ranger Battalion. Later briefings traced activities of the follow-on regiment (the 115th Infantry), which started landing about 1100. Good use was made of vantage points along the road between D-3 and D-1.

Four vignettes described much of what happened on the western half of OMAHA Beach; they involved Company A, 116th Infantry; Company C, 2d Ranger Battalion; 1st Platoon, Company A, 5th Ranger Battalion; and Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota's leadership

Overlooking the landing site, we could picture what happened to Company A, 116th Infantry, as it came ashore opposite the strongest enemy fortifications—the unit was completely out of action in ten minutes. On the other hand, half of Company C, 2d Ranger Battalion, made it across the western end of DOG GREEN and eventually eliminated the German cliff defenses there.

Our group climbed the steep bluff to explore a stone house and other western defenses that still remain. This historic point now marks the beginning of the Boy Scouts

of America hiking trail from OMAHA Beach to Pointe du Hoc.

At the D-1 draw, we conducted seminars on what had gone right (and wrong) with General Cota's command. We noted that many assaults violated the principles of avoiding enemy strength and attacking enemy weaknesses. Having combat veterans of previous invasions in their ranks was a big asset for units of the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions. Conversely, the lack of any combat experience in 29th Infantry Division units slowed their advance.

Finally, Team 6 told Lt. Charles A. Parker's story: how his platoon crossed the beach, mounted the high ground, made it past Vierville, and then advanced cross-country some three miles to Pointe du Hoc—without casualties. This trek by some thirty 5th Ranger Battalion soldiers can be considered a D-day miracle.

Jean Centner and I returned to the cemetery administration building for a meeting with Phil Rivers, while instructors and students moved on to Pointe du Hoc, where they explored German fortifications, some of which stand intact after forty-nine years. Ron Millis briefed the group on what Companies D, E, and F faced in their landings. Both he and Steve Yackley described friendly and enemy actions on the Pointe.

Meanwhile, Centner and I arrived at the cemetery to discover that my scheduled talk in Bayeux to a group of Parisian businessmen had somehow gone awry. This cancellation made our day a lot easier, as we rejoined the staff ride in time for Team 6's instructions. Unhappily, we also witnessed several civilian tour groups being misinformed by their guides. Obviously, there is an urgent need for commercial guide education before the fiftieth anniversary commemoration.

Waiting for us in the Luxembourg Hotel lobby were Capt. Doug Burrer and his special guest, Col. Hans von Luck, a highly respected *Panzer* commander. At Doug's request, Luck had traveled from Hamburg to brief us on the actions of Erwin Rommel's forces, especially the *21st Panzer Division*, during the D-day 1944 assault and subsequent battles. Colonel Luck looks ten years younger than his eighty-two years. He is a most likeable and interesting person.

Our next scheduled event of the day was the Eisenhower groundbreaking ceremony at the Bayeux traffic circle on the highway to Caen. Each member of our group had received a special invitation from the mayor, and all active duty staff ride participants were in uniform, including Captain Coreau. Mr. Mercader joined us at 1630 and led our small convoy to the ceremony site.

Several hundred local residents joined French, British, Canadian, and American war veterans for a most pleasant late afternoon commemoration. Representatives of each country, including myself, made short talks emphasizing the many contributions of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. I proudly introduced our handsome Fort Benning contingent and briefly related how General Eisenhower had awarded me the Silver Star on 2 April 1944. Thereafter, we signed documents for an official time capsule to be placed adjacent to the memorial.

Because of the ceremony, we had dinner later than usual, followed around 2130 by a great talk by Colonel Luck. A lively question and answer session followed.

Shortly thereafter, I received a call from Phil Rivers, requesting two American representatives to assist the "French Friends of Pointe-du-Hoc" in placing flowers at our memorial on Sunday, 6 June—just hours away. Our response was immediate and positive: several officers would be there to represent the United States.

As Jean Centner, Colonel Luck, and I headed for bed, our twelve younger officers hit the road again—this time for Pegasus Bridge, with its annual gathering of British war veterans. They met Maj. John Howard and a few more survivors of his 1944 glider assault force. His traditional recounting of the "battle at the bridge" lasted from 0016 until 0044, after which our group returned to the Luxembourg for a couple of hours of much needed sleep. So ended the longest, busiest day of our Normandy staff ride.

Sunday, 6 June. Jean and I headed out of Bayeux for OMAHA Beach at 0540 on this clear, chilly morning. It was the beginning of our forty-ninth anniversary commemoration of D-day. The tide was way out, just the opposite of 6 June 1944.

We watched the "dirty dozen" enter the English Channel until the 38-degree F. salt water was neck deep. Then, reversing direction, our captains and majors hit EASY RED at 0630—right on schedule. Captain Coreau recorded this reenactment on video camera, while Jean and I overworked our 35-mm. color cameras. Reporters from *Stars and Stripes* interviewed most of us for a front-page story that appeared 7 June 1993.

Some early risers, including Phil Rivers, watched from the cemetery overlook. They liked what they saw, but agreed that it was no portrayal of what happened there forty-nine years ago. In my mind, there is no way anyone today can produce a meaningful reenactment of the 6 June 1944 Normandy invasion.

Three vehicles filled with soaking wet officers made it back to the Luxembourg for a change of clothes and a most welcome continental breakfast. As might be expected, it was a noisy dining room—full of war stories.

The twelve new OVERLORD experts, following their personal "invasion" of OMAHA Beach.

Afterwards, we headed back to the cemetery for commemoration activities.

Phil Rivers planned, produced, and directed the forty-ninth anniversary commemoration of D-day. He briefed our Fort Benning contingent, as well as other visiting groups; directed everyone into position; and ensured that the recorded music synchronized with the sequence of events. Participants and visitors formed a large hollow square. Within the Rotunda, a French honor guard platoon dressed in authentic American World War II uniforms faced north; our twelve active-duty officers faced south, and color guard representatives from American and French veterans' associations looked west. Several hundred spectators, including D-day veterans and their families, assembled just below the broad Rotunda steps. They faced east toward the 22-foot bronze memorial and speaker's podium.

At 1015 the morning's commemorative program began with the placing of four beautiful floral arrangements. It continued with the playing of the French and American national anthems, rendering of military salutes, and, finally, Taps. Immediately thereafter, the assembly relaxed to hear from a number of designated speakers, of which I was the first. Jean Centner joined me at the podium to translate.

My primary goal was to honor American D-day veterans who had made the long trip to France. I also took the opportunity to explain the purpose of our Normandy staff ride. In closing, I asked D-day veterans to raise their hands and urged them to tell their war stories to our young officers.

As we had done a week earlier on Memorial Day, our group placed flowers at the 1st Division monument overlooking OMAHA Beach, at the grave at Lt. Jimmie Monteith, and at the grave of Lieutenant Turnbull of the 82d Airborne Division. The story of Turnbull's bravery north of Ste. Mere Eglise on D-day had touched every member of our group, and we wanted to salute him on this special occasion.

Jean Centner and I moved about the cemetery, pausing to chat with anyone who had a question or who just wanted to say hello. Finally, toward midafternoon, we moved our base of operations to the L'OMAHA restaurant for the cheese sandwich special and a cold draft beer. French friends of the past week introduced their colleagues from Paris who, it seemed, wanted answers to scores of questions. I declined a television interview, but agreed to provide information for any and all press releases. Jean and I returned to Bayeux around 1600, in time for a brief nap and some preliminary packing.

According to the Center of Military History, there are three phases to a successful staff ride: the preliminary study phase, the field study phase, and the integration phase. We had devoted almost eleven months to getting ready, and from 29 May through 6 June to on-site instruction and analysis. Now it was time for the final

phase, which is generally most successful when it immediately follows the field study.

From 1800 through 1930 we assembled in the hotel lounge for a frank discussion of what we had accomplished and what—if anything—we had failed to do. With Colonel Luck and Jean Centner as invited observers, each participant summarized his reactions and conclusions. Basically, each agreed that the year-long study (including the unique Normandy experience) was his finest educational opportunity thus far in the Army. Each now felt qualified to make an important contribution during the fiftieth anniversary commemoration activities.

One of my best decisions of the trip was to have dinner with Colonel Luck and our German experts, Mike McManus and John Carothers. Hans, ever the fascinating storyteller, is the most experienced World War II *Panzer* commander still alive and well. It was a pleasure for both of us to answer or comment on questions from the two younger officers. I look forward to seeing all three men again in June 1994.

Just after dinner Christopher Burns, representing the Associated Press (AP) in Paris, requested a telephone interview concerning our trip to Normandy. I was happy to oblige, and, as a result, many newspapers throughout the United States carried front-page stories about what we had done during the previous week.

Monday, 7 June. Following a very early breakfast and a round of goodbyes, I was driven to Charles de Gaulle Airport. Meanwhile, the Fort Benning contingent headed for the heart of Paris for briefings at the French staff college. There was also time for some sightseeing and relaxation before their next-day flight to Atlanta, Georgia.

Epilogue. Looking ahead to fiftieth anniversary commemoration of D-day, Maj. Gen. Jerry White and I joined in a noble endeavor—a Fort Benning initiative—to educate twelve outstanding officer instructors on all aspects of Operation OVERLORD. We started in July 1992, read a lot, talked a lot, and finally ended our studies with a fabulous Normandy staff ride. In all my military experience, I have never had a better opportunity to pass along our proud Army heritage to such a dedicated, professional group of young Army officers.

I believe the following extracts from my 20 June 1993 letter to General Gordon R. Sullivan appropriately conclude this account of our OVERLORD educational program:

> The torch has now been passed from this old soldier to twelve of your finest captains and majors—who will be colonels and generals in the not too distant future. They are now fully prepared to chair seminars for, or make presentations to, a wide variety of Americans from mid-school teenagers to our highest officials.... They are proven experts in conducting military professional development programs.
>
> You know that Al Smith will campaign for maximum use of this highly talented USAIS contingent, from now through the fiftieth anniversary of D-day commemoration. However, without your continuing personal encouragement and that of your senior commanders, I guarantee very few Active Army soldiers will hear much about this greatest of our one-day battles—the beginning of the end of World War II in Europe.

Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith, Jr., served for more than thirty-three years with the Army. Retired in 1974, General Smith continues to work with senior Department of the Army officials on special historical projects.

Editor's Journal

We are pleased to have a special Normandy feature article by Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), to begin this issue of *Army History*. General Smith describes his personal, determined approach to the ongoing study of D-day.

The "Archaic Archivist" is not included in this issue; this feature will resume with the next issue.

A few of our contributors of book reviews may be waiting patiently for them to appear. Rest assured that we very much appreciate our reviewers and that the items will be published. If there is a delay it is because, even more so than with our articles, reviews are subject to inclusion in an issue as space permits (and at the end of an issue, as we run up against a four-page signature...).

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

This column is being composed as we finish a fiscal year, once again finding year-end funds to supplement our publishing. In recent years last-minute windfalls have kept the budget above $1 million annually. Part of that money is spent to keep all Center of Military History (CMH) publications in print, with sufficient stocks in the Army's publications depot in Baltimore to fill the Total Army need. A few dollars also go to produce a small catalog to inform Army users and Government Printing Office customers of available titles. I can see patterns and trends in those titles that may interest readers of this column.

The backbone of our publications program is still traditional operational history. Jeff Clarke's and Robert Ross Smith's *Riviera to the Rhine* is an important addition to the World War II series, and Frank Schubert's and Theresa Kraus' *The Whirlwind War* will begin our publications on DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Meanwhile, CMH historians have finally found an approach to the operational history of the Vietnam War that should satisfy veterans and scholars, so those long-awaited volumes should soon begin to appear.

Medical histories have long been central to CMH's program, and that tradition is continued in Graham Cosmas' and Albert Cowdrey's *Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations* and Ann Hartwick's *The Army Medical Specialist Corps*. Clinical histories are still being produced alongside medical organizational histories, with orthopedic surgery of the Vietnam era to appear soon, but the short-term trend will be toward organizational history, with a history of the Medical Service Corps and Mary Gillett's next volume in the history of the Army Medical Department scheduled to appear soon.

New scholarship on old wars addressing the needs of special audiences will continue to appear. David Hogan's *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* is a perfect example of those books, soon to be joined by monographs on doctrine for low-intensity conflict and the organization of an army headquarters for sustained operational activity.

New volumes that set forth the history and lineage of Army branches will continue to appear periodically. Robert Wright's *Military Police* is the most recent addition to that shelf, soon to be joined by John Finnegan's and Romana Danysh's Military Intelligence volume. Resources will soon be needed to update certain volumes in that series before they are again reprinted.

Coimprinting histories with the Army's Major Commands has become sufficiently established to be called a "trend" and may prove to be an important new approach in the lean years ahead. Coimprinting gives a headquarters an important voice in the production process, allows some significant cost sharing, and provides wider circulation for the finished product. Frank Schubert's *Building Air Bases in the Negev*, Adrian Traas' *The U.S. Army Topographical Engineers in the Mexican War*, and John Finnegan's and James Gilbert's *U.S. Army Signals Intelligence in World War II* are all examples of this approach.

Given the size and complexity of the U.S. Army's history effort, specialized guides are an important part of our publication program. Cody Phillips took the lead in producing *A Guide to U.S. Army Museums*, and Richard Adamczyk and Morris MacGregor displayed similar initiative when they updated the *Reader's Guide* to the U.S. Army in World War II series. Small brochures providing overviews of CMH, the National Museum of the U.S. Army, and the Army Art Collection have no author's name appended, but they provide accurate information for visitors and correspondents at very low cost, and a few dollars will be devoted to updating and expanding the number of such guides in the future.

World War II commemoration has resulted in the most new titles in recent years. During the bicentennial of the Constitution, CMH historians produced many small educational pamphlets which have now been incorporated into an expanded edition of *Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution*. That successful experiment inspired us to use a similar approach to World War II, producing short studies of each campaign that put a streamer on the Army flag. Using Wayne Dzwonchyk's and Ray Skates' general essays to form *A Brief History of World War II*, we carried the campaign series well into 1944 with FY 93 funds.

The largest new field of publishing in recent years has been Army art. Year-end funds in FY 91 allowed us to publish an extensive series of World War II commemorative art, and an agreement with the Smithsonian Institution made possible a smaller World War I series. General Gordon R. Sullivan's interest in the Army Art Collection resulted in his *Portrait of an Army* and should soon produce another volume to foster greater awareness

of the breadth and quality of the Army's art holdings.

Army art has also become cover art for a new line of paperback reprints. Year-end money in FY 92 allowed us to produce paperback editions of World War II "green books" covering operations likely to be used for officer professional development or staff rides. These paperbacks are produced in shrink-wrapped packages with the fine CMH maps that were originally placed in the back of the hardcover editions. Extra copies of the map sets were produced and can be ordered separately. These maps are proving their worth on old battlefields and in classrooms. *Cross-Channel Attack* is the most recent addition to this reprint series, and it will probably be one of the most popular.

Reprints of Army publications not originally produced by CMH are other publications made possible through year-end funds and that are filling a distinct need. My predecessors began publication of the seventeen-volume series, *United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919*, which is now complete. We added the fine American Battle Monuments guidebook, *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe*, last year, and this year we turned year-end funds to World War II to produce reprints of the final reports of Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and MacArthur. Those will join *Logistics in World War II*, the final report of the Army Service Forces, reprinted first because the emphasis on campaign history in our commemorative literature had given insufficient attention to strategic logistics. Some of this publishing activity can be scaled back as our part of World War II commemorative work comes to an end. New titles and new reprints will continue to appear in virtually every category to feed the Army's continuing need for history publications. And of course funds must continue to be budgeted for *Army History*, the annual *Department of the Army Historical Summary*, new regulations, and special monographs for internal use such as William Epley's *Roles and Missions of the United States Army*.

Ideas from our readers help shape this program, and we welcome your comments. Even though many of our publishing projects are funded at the last minute, we keep projects "on call" so that we are ready when funds become available. We welcome your ideas if the trends I have outlined fail to meet your needs.

Army Doctrine Development
The French Experience, 1871-1914

Eric W. Kaempfer

Today's Army faces fundamental changes as it adapts to world events. New military adversaries are emerging, and alliances and economies are shifting rapidly, in ways difficult to predict or even anticipate. As these circumstances as well as budget realities force the downsizing and restructuring of the U.S. Army, its mission and focus will adjust to meet new challenges.

Doctrine development and implementation will be essential elements of maintaining readiness and lethality during this time. Throughout history nations and their armies have struggled to keep pace with the changing conditions and advancing technologies of warfare. Historically, some armies have made this transition smoothly, while others have not, often with disastrous results. A key experience in the evolution of effective military doctrine is that of the French Army in the wake of its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. This article will look at the war's effects on the French Army, its doctrinal response, and that doctrine's subsequent employment in the early stages of World War I.

Emerging technologies and expanding industrial capacities during the 1800s worked to change the conduct of warfare at a dizzying pace; the art and practice of war were altered in fundamental ways from the time of the Congress of Vienna to the siege of Sedan sixty-five years later. Various strategists and philosophers, both military and otherwise, grappled with the doctrinal problems these changes created—a race intensified by growing international competition in Europe for power and influence. As the capabilities of land armies increased, governments assiduously sought every advantage through force or the threat of force. The marriage of mass citizen armies, introduced in the Napoleonic Wars, with new weaponry and equipment that maximized their effect, brought a new potential for annihilation and finality to European conflict. National rivalry was nothing new to two traditional continental enemies, France and the Kingdom of Prussia; from invasion and counterinvasion, Jena to Waterloo, the enmity of the French and Germans ran deep.

France found itself on the losing side of this equation in 1871. Although its forces compared favorably with

those of the Germans in terms of strength, fighting spirit, and weapons technology, the poor structure and performance of the French high command doomed its army to defeat. The markedly superior command organization of Count Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and Otto von Bismarck enabled the Prussian Army to react more quickly, fight more effectively, and seize and retain the strategic initiative in a manner that the French were never able to overcome.

The peace terms Prussia imposed were extremely harsh for the time and signaled the coming of total war: loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, France's traditional defense against invasion (including the vital fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz); and a reparation of 5 billion francs, a huge amount intended to cripple the French economy for a generation. (1) Bismarck recognized the link between economics and military power and thus sought to limit French military strength through a heavy war indemnity.

But these measures did not have their intended effect. The rapid collapse and defeat of the French Army leadership greatly embarrassed the French people and astonished the world. Extensive colonial experience and Napoleon III's repeated efforts toward European hegemony had given the French Army an excellent reputation, and its capitulation at the hands of the Prussians was among the greatest upsets in history to that time. The French felt betrayed by their emperor and their generals. Rather than cowering before the Germans and their peace terms, the French moved toward a quick recovery, spurred by a consuming desire for *revanche* (revenge). As Victor Hugo said, "France will have but one thought: to reconstitute her forces, gather her energy, nourish her sacred anger, work without cease, and become again the France of an idea with a sword. Then one day she will be irresistible and she will take back Alsace-Lorraine." (2)

With an enormous effort France paid off the crushing reparations in record time; the last Prussian occupation forces left French soil in 1873. French military and diplomatic efforts then of necessity began to focus on rebuilding the economy and the army.

France's defeat in the war mandated a purely defensive military strategy vis-a-vis Germany for many years after 1871. This was due not only to war reparations and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, but also to the war's profound effects upon the army as an institution. The humiliating defeats at Metz and Sedan had shattered the spirit of the army; the confidence of the people was lost and much soul-searching and recriminations began among the military leaders. The critical task thus became the rebirth of the army in strength sufficient to defend France's national recovery. Success seemed doubtful in the face of Germany's overwhelming power.

Consequently, French postwar military thought for the first fifteen years after the war was dominated by a policy of passive defense. To this end, France expended prodigious sums and effort to rebuild its exposed German frontier with a complex system of fortifications and fortresses. These fortifications linked the forts of Belfort, Epinal, Toul, and Verdun into a fixed defense plan designed solely to shield the army from German invasion until it could deploy to protect Paris. The French Army Infantry Regulations of 1875 also paid heed to the increased lethality of the battlefield (as demonstrated in 1870) and dictated dispersed infantry tactics, adequate fire preparation, and no massed formations within range of enemy guns. (3)

The French population's desire for revenge, however, could not long tolerate this state of affairs, and many called for greater offensive spirit in both strategic and tactical planning. Germany, as the new center of Europe and its most powerful nation, had decisively outstripped France in both economic power and population, and now laid claim to European leadership in the arts, culture, and foreign affairs, threatening to isolate France as a second-tier power. The French sought a weapon, an *idea*, to balance the scales.

Out of this void emerged the one thing Frenchmen had that they felt Germans could never possess: the spirit of the French people. French philosophers such as Henri Bergson began to speak of *elan vital*, the all-powerful spirit at the heart of French society that would not bow to the strictly mortal terms of armaments and numerical superiority. The inherent greatness of the French people, their *will* to win, was superior and would carry them to ultimate victory regardless of the odds. (4) Belief in *elan* and the Napoleonic tradition began to infuse the French with a new spirit of confidence, restoring their faith in ultimate victory against the German menace. Frenchmen began to believe that this fervor would avenge the defeat of 1871 should war come again.

The French naturally looked to their army as the means to turn belief into reality. As the public mood shifted from cowering victim to defiant adversary, the status of the army began to change; it was seen less as the cause of defeat and more as the instrument of *revanche*. This was due in no small part to the army's introduction of reforms after the 1871 *debacle*; exhaustive studies were made, universal military service for five years was instituted to form new reserves, and a staff college was founded to improve officer professionalism. These measures went far in rebuilding the tatters of a once proud military force. (5) As the army restored its confidence, its status in French affairs rose to tremendous heights. The

army was cheered and feted as a glorious force that would some day defeat Germany and retake Alsace-Lorraine. It was the defender of the nation and the means of restoring the glory of France. This fervent nationalism and adulation inevitably had their effect upon the French Army's doctrine, role, and outlook. *Revanche*, the army's perceived decline in status after 1871, and memories of the *Grand Armee* soon led the force back to emphasis on the attack.

Elan Influences Army Doctrine

As the means to *elan*'s end, the army began to adapt the emerging offensive spirit to doctrine. An important role was played by the lessons taken from the Franco-Prussian War:

The French people...carefully observed the events of the war of 1866, and sought the secret of Prussian victory only in the superiority of their armament...it was an axiom for the French Army...to remain strictly on the defensive. They thought that the offensive power of the German Army would be broken by the defensive action of new and terrible weapons...they ruined in that way the spirit of their army...whatever is done in an army should always aim at increasing and strengthening that moral strength. (6)

The relative inaction and defensive posture of the French Army during the war was seen as a major, if not the most important, factor in the Prussian victory, a point frequently raised by military leaders and critics. They argued that only a return to the Napoleonic traditions of skillful maneuver and violent attack at the "decisive point" could bring success.

The most influential French military theorist of this period was General (later Marshal) Ferdinand Foch, then director of the *Ecole Superieure de la Guerre* (French War College). Foch had great impact upon the students and army leaders of the day through his teachings and lectures on the principles of war. Foch fully believed in the power of the attack and in offensive spirit, declaring that "the offensive...can alone give results...modern war can admit of no other arguments than those which help destroy an army: the battle...to seek enemy armies...in order to beat and destroy them, to follow the tactics that lead there in the quickest and surest manner, such is the lesson of modern war." In turn Foch taught the importance of soldierly morale in this pursuit: "A battle won is...that in which one will not confess oneself beaten." To develop this spirit in soldiers, he held the army leadership responsible: "To organize the battle.... in order to break the morale of the enemy, we must first raise ours to the highest pitch.... The will to conquer is the first condition of victory: it is the supreme resolution with which a commander must fill the souls of his subordinates."

However, Foch was careful to temper these statements with advice of equal emphasis on *surete* (protection) for army operations. He stressed the need for careful reconnaissance, well-developed discipline, sufficient firepower, and above all common sense. He was not unaware of the revolution in weaponry:

Because of their power, modern weapons forbid any maneuver under fire; because of their range, they compel assuming at long range battle formations, deploying far away; because of their rapidity of fire these necessities may be enforced even by troops comparatively weak. As firearms improve, the infantry is compelled, in order to advance, to travel under cover, at least from enemy artillery. To that end, it takes advantage of everry favorable means of approach for as long a time as possible. The necessity of cover is increasing daily...only behind a curtain of shells that destroy obstacles and silence enemy guns will the infantry be able to advance.

He instructed his charges that *elan* alone was not enough; that

Fire is the supreme argument. The most ardent troops, those whose morale has been most excited...will encounter great difficulties, and suffer heavy casualties, whenever their partial offensive has not been prepared by effective fire...the superiority of fire...becomes the most important element of an infantry's fighting value.

The idea that enthusiasm *alone* would bring victory, Foch warned, was "infantile nonsense." (7)

How were these principles to be put into practice? The revolution in battlefield weaponry during the late 1800s was studied by French planners, who were troubled by the dilemma of restoring offensive decision in the face of immense defensive firepower. On its face, machine guns, high-powered artillery, smokeless powder, and rifle improvements seemed to doom the attack as a viable option in combat; what could be done to restore the balance?

The Infantry Regulations of 1875 were a first attempt to deal with these questions and were taken largely from the tactics of the victorious Prussian Army. They mandated dispersed infantry formations and massed artillery fires in attack and defense, and they forbade massed infantry when within range of concentrated enemy fire. In essence, they followed the dictums of General Foch's *surete*. However, these ideas came under immediate

attack from French senior officers for several reasons: since new weapons capabilities had greatly expanded the width and depth of the battlefield, a field commander could no longer view and control his entire army from a single location; and since command and control technology had not kept pace with other developments, there arose credible doubts as to whether mass conscript armies could be effectively controlled and maneuvered in the dispersed manner envisioned by the regulations. It was feared that raw, unprofessional troops would "go to ground" in the face of intense defensive firepower and spoil the attack; therefore, critics claimed that the answer was overwhelming *elan* and massed, tightly packed formations. (8) Even Foch echoed this sentiment: "To flee or to charge, that is all that remains. To charge, but charge in numbers as one mass, therein lies safety...numbers give us moral superiority by the sentiment of strength which they create, and which we will increase by formations." (9)

This argument proved decisive, and so the Regulations of 1884 instructed troops to "march forward, with head held high, regardless of losses...under the most violent fire, even against strongly defended entrenchments, and seize them." (10)

As the twentieth century dawned, the "moral elements" of war assumed ever-greater prominence in French military thought. An important factor in doctrine development was the observation of its use by other armies at war, an opportunity provided by the outbreak of the Boer War in South Africa, in which many of the newest weapons were used by both sides. European observers watched with keen interest the experience of the British Army and the use of the attack against greatly improved defensive firepower.

Before the war, the British had concluded that advances in artillery-ranging and indirect-fire techniques in the offense would nullify any increases in defensive strength. Thus, the traditional massed assault was still preferred over dispersed formations, and "the second line, relying on cold steel only, [was] entrusted the duty of bringing the battle to a speedy conclusion." However, these tactics brought defeat for the British in the first battles of the war; the Boers' defensive prowess in rifle marksmanship and fortification easily overcame any British advantage in *elan* and artillery. As a result, British theorists began to lose their enthusiasm for the massed infantry attack. When European critics claimed that the true cause of British defeat was poorly motivated troops and lack of morale in the attack, the British observer Col. G.F.R. Henderson replied, "When the preponderant masses suffer enormous losses; when they feel, as they will feel, that other and less costly means of achieving the same end might have been adopted, what *will* become of their morale?" This question the French would answer after the Neville Offensive in 1917.

Although the French initially attempted to modify their tactics in response to the British experience in South Africa and to rely less on *elan* to defeat defenses, again the French senior leadership objected. In addition to previous arguments regarding the questionable resolve of conscripts and the need for Napoleonic *furia francese*, French society, rent by the Dreyfus Affair, had polarized the forces of traditionalism and reform in France. Many French officers saw socialistic Dreyfusard menace in any attempt to steer the army away from *elan* and the massed assault. The affair thus served to reinforce the reactionary tendencies of the senior army leadership against doctrinal reform; in fact, many saw their overriding duty as the effort to combat the "abnormal dread of losses on the battlefield."

These views were soon reinforced still further in the minds of Frenchmen upon the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Both sides employed modern weapons and technologies: barbed wire, electrically detonated minefields, machine gun redoubts, telegraph, and field telephones. The persistent efforts of the Japanese to assault through Russian defenses were watched closely by all European powers, and the view they drew was that the offense was still alive and well. The Japanese skillfully used night advances, careful entrenchment, and heavy artillery preparation to mount successful attacks. The cost was very high, however; the Japanese lost 50,000 assaulting Port Arthur and 75,000 in ten days in the battle of Mukden. But this loss was seen as the necessary price of success in the age of modern weaponry; the key to victory was not the technology and firepower employed but the *morale* of the nation wielding them and its ability to withstand terrible casualties:

There were those who deduced from the experience in South Africa that the assault, or at least the assault with the bayonet, was a thing of the past, a scrap-heap maneuver...the Manchurian campaign showed over and over again that the bayonet was in no sense an obsolete weapon and that fire alone could not always suffice to move from a position a determined and well-disciplined enemy...the assault is even of more importance than the attainment of fire mastery that antecedes it. It is the supreme moment of the fight. Upon it the final issue depends. (11)

Elan Becomes Army Doctrine

The primacy of the offensive was thus justified and rationalized by European military leaders early in the

1900s. In France this process was greatly accelerated upon the appointment of General Joseph Joffre as chief of the general staff in 1911. Joffre drew the balance of his military experience from his long service in the colonial army, which tended to emphasize individual initiative, dash, and forceful character over more methodical approaches. The rivalry and hatred between the colonials and the *metropole* was deep, with the home army regarding colonial service as a refuge for marginal and unsophisticated officers who should be cashiered and the colonials seeing the metropolitan army as a corrupt, lethargic, politicized force worthy of contempt—a view that the stigma of the Dreyfus Affair only reinforced. Joffre saw this perceived sluggishness as the greatest obstacle to French *revanche*, and so he advocated the offensive to all.

Joffre's eager accomplice in this effort was Col. Louis de Grandmaison, the head of the Directorate of Military Operations. In a series of lectures delivered in 1911, he urged the French Army to even greater efforts in the attack: "The attack exploited to the finish is the essential act of war" and "once engaged, must be pushed to the end, with no second thoughts, to the limits of human endurance.... From the moment of action every soldier must desire the assault by bayonet as the supreme means of imposing his will upon the enemy and gaining victory." (12) This in itself was not unusual—almost all contemporary European armies and their theorists were in complete agreement. However, Grandmaison soon expanded the philosophy to argue that the attack was actually the *only* proper option for France: "It is more important to develop a conquering state of mind than to cavil about tactics." (13) Gradually, theory and reality began to part company: "For the attack, only two things are necessary: to know where the enemy is and to decide what to do. What the enemy intends to do is of no consequence. ...every inch of occupied ground must be defended to the death; if lost, regained by immediate counterattack, regardless of circumstance." (14) This thinking culminated in Grandmaison's crowning achievement in his efforts to shape the offensive disposition of the army through his authorship of the 1913 infantry regulations. In these, he wrote that the "French Army, returning to its traditions, henceforth admits no law but the offensive." *Elan* had become *offense a outrance* (offense without limit), and as such the formal doctrine of the French Army. "Battles are beyond anything else struggles of morale. Defeat is inevitable as soon as the hope of conquering ceases to exist. Success comes not to him who has suffered the least but to him whose will is firmest and morale strongest." (15)

The pervasiveness of *elan* had great effect on the French Army beyond the theoretical aspects long before it became official doctrine. French structure, equipment, and planning were continually modified during the late 1800s better to serve the purpose of the offensive.

In organization and weaponry, the most telling effect was the reduction of the artillery in both caliber and number. Whereas the Germans had gained a great appreciation for heavy artillery in their 1866 and 1870 campaigns and had pioneered the development and use of super-heavy siege artillery (made expressly for the reduction of Belgian and French fortresses), the French saw little need for large-caliber, long-range guns: "You talk to us of heavy artillery. Thank God, we have none. The strength of the French Army is in the lightness of its guns." (16) Heavy artillery was seen as indicative of a static and defeatist mentality that had no place in *offense a outrance*.

Instead, light artillery, specifically the 75-mm. gun, was developed. An outstanding weapon, its relatively light weight and hydraulic recoil carriage allowed responsive and rapid fire support for attacking infantry. However, its limited range (four kilometers) and flat trajectory were serious shortcomings in almost all other circumstances, especially against field fortifications. This flaw was not considered important, however, because it was assumed that the army would not assume the defensive in future conflicts (except temporarily in order to resume the offensive), and a parsimonious government anxious to avoid expensive heavy artillery programs was not eager to argue the matter.

As a result, by 1914 the German Army possessed 3,500 medium and heavy artillery pieces to the French Army's 300. Each side had artillery organic to its infantry divisions, but the Germans equipped theirs with 72 guns (of which 18 were 105-mm.) as opposed to the French division's 36 (all 75-mm.). In fact, the French had fewer guns in the division than the Russians at the outbreak of the war. (17) The intent of such light, maneuverable artillery was to suppress enemy positions through rapid, direct fire, but the French were to discover that the superior distance and accuracy of German artillery often decided the issue before the French guns could come into range.

Infantrymen themselves suffered from the thrall of *elan*. Thoughtful French observers at the Balkan and Boer wars had noted the benefits to the combatants of field-colored uniforms and had urged modifications of the French garb, which had remained essentially unchanged since the 1830s (blue jacket, red trousers, and red kepi). Even with the added example of the Germans (who were changing from Prussian blue to *feldgrau*), *elan* enthusiasts would not hear of it: "Eliminate the red

trousers? Never! *Le pantalon rouge c'est la France*!" (18) "To banish all that is colorful, all that gives the soldier his vivid aspect, is to go contrary both to French taste and military function." (19) And so the infantry went off to battle in August 1914 clothed as conspicuously as Napoleon's army a hundred years previously, with unfortunate results.

The French Army also suffered difficulties in manpower and readiness, mainly due to the strained relationship between the regulars and reservists. The adherents of *elan* felt that unprofessional levies and conscripts were incapable of mastering the *esprit* and discipline necessary to assault in the expected hail of defensive shot and shell; only in the elite regulars could the required obedience and resolve be instilled. The presence of reservists in the front-line forces in significant numbers was thought to be a corrupting influence that would dull the French fighting edge. (20) Thus, French reservists were poorly trained and equipped, while the Germans carefully prepared their *Landwehr* units for incorporation into Alfred Count von Schlieffen's famous plan. In time of war the French reserves were relegated to garrison and rear-area duty, while the *Landwehr* was integrated into front-line formations to ensure numerical superiority. Traditional aversion to true universal conscription and the French belief in the *levee en masse* (which contended that the true citizen-army needed little formal training) precluded substantive change. This French opinion of the reserves distorted their analysis of German strength and intentions until the start of the war.

The imperative of *offense a outrance* thus placed the five French armies in 1914 well forward for an all-out attack to the Rhine River. A two-pronged offensive was planned east and northeast across Lorraine, since this was the most direct route and the path of the expected German invasion. However, in order to mass sufficient strength for this plan (the infamous Plan XVII) without the use of reserves, all available forces were concentrated in the frontier region between Belfort and Hirson. The remainder of the frontier north to the sea was left especially open to possible German invasion.

The French discounted this possibility for several reasons. First, German manpower was deemed insufficient to execute the gigantic sweeping maneuver required to advance through northern France and Belgium (intelligence about the use of *Landwehr* units was rejected). Second, it was widely believed that the Germans would not violate Belgian neutrality and invoke British intervention (as they had not in 1870). Most important, *elan* enthusiasts felt that in the remote event of such a maneuver, it would actually *benefit* the French attack: the more resources Germany committed to a northerly sweep, the more vulnerable its armies would be to the French assault. In such a scenario, French planners envisioned the army's moving to the rear of the German onslaught and severing it from its lines of communication and bases of supply.

Although in theory these arguments had credence, by 1914 they ignored strategic realities. Germany had allowed for the manpower shortage alleged by the French. Moreover, contrary to French belief, the younger Moltke *did* plan to advance through Belgium in the event of war, believing (as did Schlieffen) that the military benefits far outweighed any political repercussions. The German general staff also was fully aware of Plan XVII and planned to encourage its progress in central France more fully to entrap the French Army in the Schlieffen envelopment.

These developments were not unknown to the French at the time. Espionage and subversion had made many military secrets available to both sides—the French had in fact obtained an early copy of the Schlieffen Plan (1904) that essentially was correct in overall terms. (21) But French planners felt secure in their ability to dictate the terms of battle to the Germans in any future conflict: "We'll cut them in half...if they [Germans] come as far as Lille, so much the better for us." (22) All intelligence that seemed to dictate reassessment or modification of Plan XVII and the *offense a outrance* was discounted, altered, or simply ignored. All training, plans, and hopes were vested in the attack and the race to the Rhine. *Elan* would thus carry the French Army through the fall of 1914. As the president of the republic, M. Fallieres, stated in 1913: "The offense alone is suited to the temperament of French soldiers....We are determined to march straight against the enemy without hesitation."

France and Germany both went to war with their respective campaigns intact, and both went to enormous effort to implement them fully. Germany's northern assault took France totally by surprise; the Germans gained an enormous amount of territory for little loss, and their seizure of the ore-rich regions of the French frontier was crucial to sustaining the German war effort. However, Moltke's bid to end the war quickly ended at the Marne River; the Schlieffen Plan succeeded tactically but was a strategic failure.

France rushed to the attack in Alsace-Lorraine and, initially, fell into the German trap. Local German commanders, however, upset with the planned withdrawal before the enemy and anxious for glory, argued for and received the opportunity to repulse the French invaders. This they accomplished with great success; the attacking Frenchmen, resplendent in their colorful uniforms and

massed as the *Grande Armee* of old, made perfect targets for German artillery and machine guns. In most cases accurate German fire decimated the concentrated formations before the French "75s" could engage the enemy, and French leadership, fired with enthusiasm born of *revanche*, pressed suicidal attacks long after any hope of success faded. *Elan* failed miserably and bloodily in front of the German trenches; over 140,000 Frenchmen were battlefield casualties after only four days of battle—300,000 in two weeks. Of the 1.5 million French soldiers engaged in combat in August 1914, one in four became a statistic within six weeks. Of these, 110,000 were dead. (23) As a French officer related: "Three hundred men of our regiment lay there in sublime order. At the first whistling of bullets, the officers had cried 'Line up!' and all went to their deaths as in a parade." (24)

Alongside the fallen lay the remnants of Plan XVII and any remaining hopes for a quick and decisive end to the war. However, the French high command did not blame the plan itself—the problem was poor execution. Their stubborn insistence on a doctrine with twenty years' standing was not be discarded lightly. The French continued their attempts to force *offense a outrance* to work, resulting in terrible casualties and defeats throughout 1914-15. These efforts eventually culminated in the disastrous Neville Offensive in 1917 and the near total mutiny of the French Army. G.F.R. Henderson's prediction had finally come true.

France's experience with *elan* at the turn of the century is a powerful reminder of the consequences of fatally flawed doctrine. U.S. Army leaders must always maintain the balance between morale, esprit de corps, and more mundane but equally important matters such as logistics and training. The French emphasis on the offensive and *elan* was not in itself disastrous; today's FM 100-5 *(Operations)* also highlights this method as decisive in war, and certainly the teachings of Foch, Joffre, Grandmaison, and others were very much in keeping with the mood of the time. But the transformation of *elan* into a national obsession, into *offense a outrance*, led the army to disaster. France's defeat in 1871, coupled with its precarious postwar position and desire for revenge, led its military leaders to institutionalize a doctrine that proved unrealistic and unsuited to modern warfare. There were farsighted French leaders who saw the dangers ahead, but parochialism, tradition, and suspicion bred by the Dreyfus Affair halted all reform efforts. Advances in technology had given the defense a degree of advantage rarely seen in warfare, one not equaled by the offense until the evolution of the tank. Until then, *elan* alone could do little to balance the scales and bring victory to the attacker.

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20. Tuchman, *Guns of August*, pp. 35-36; House, *Towards Combined Arms Warfare*, p. 15.
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Studying the Anatomy of a Peacetime Contingency Operation A Staff Ride of Operation JUST CAUSE

David R. Gray and Charles T. Payne

After months of increasing political tensions and hostile actions directed against American nationals in Panama, President George Bush in December 1989 authorized the use of military force to topple the government of Manuel Noriega. Under command of Lt. Gen. (now General) Carl Stiner's Task Force SOUTH, elements from all four armed services launched attacks against twenty-seven targets throughout the country. Stiner's task force employed a mix of forward-based conventional forces, CONUS (continental U.S.)-based rapid deployment troops, numerous types of special operations units, and new, high-technology weapons to decapitate the Panama Defense Force's (PDF) command system and rapidly to overwhelm remaining PDF resistance. Within a week combat operations had ceased and U.S. forces had begun stability operations to restore law and order. Joint Task Force SOUTH stood down on 12 January 1990; combat units soon began withdrawing, leaving behind combat support and service support troops to assist in nation-building activities. Impressed by the smooth execution of JUST CAUSE, General Stiner later claimed that the operation was relatively error free, confirming the AirLand Battle doctrine and validating the strategic direction of the military. He concluded, therefore, that while old lessons were confirmed, there were "no [new] lessons learned" during the campaign. Despite Stiner's assertions, Operation JUST CAUSE offers important insights into the role of force in the post-Cold War period and the successful conduct of a peacetime contingency operation.

In the summer of 1992 the Department of History, United States Military Academy, offered selected cadets a chance to make an in-depth study of Operation JUST CAUSE. As part of the academy's Individual Academic Development (IAD) Program, two officers and seven cadets embarked on an intensive staff ride of the campaign as an example of American expeditionary warfare in the post-Vietnam era. The objectives of the 21-day program were to study the interrelationships between strategy and tactics; gain a greater appreciation of contingency operations and the capabilities of rapid deployment, special operations, and conventional forces; and expose participants to the dynamics of battle, especially the roles that leadership, unit cohesion, technology, and "friction" play in determining victory or defeat. The program's objectives reinforced the department's commitment to further the "historical mindedness" and professional development of officers and cadets involved.

The Operation JUST CAUSE staff ride consisted of a two-phase program. During the five-day preliminary study phase the group participated in classroom seminars at West Point. The cadets prepared for this phase through an intensive reading program. Weeks prior to the seminar the cadets read Thomas Donnelly, et al., *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*, to serve as their primary reference source. The instructors also provided the cadets with a supplementary staff ride read-ahead packet containing useful articles from a variety of scholarly and doctrinal sources. For the first two days the officers and cadets explored the theoretical and practical constraints on the use of force after Vietnam; the organization of the conventional, rapid deployment, and special operations forces involved in the operation; and the doctrine for contingency operations. The group studied Operation URGENT FURY to gain greater perspective on the complexities of contingency operations. Before delving into the operational and tactical aspects of Operation JUST CAUSE, the instructors discussed the historical and strategic importance of the Panama Canal and the events leading up to President Bush's decision to invade the country.

The cadets spent the remainder of this phase conducting extensive campaign analyses of each task force's operations in Panama. Using extracts from Joint Task Force South OPlan 90-2, the instructors conducted a mission briefing for the cadets to acquaint them with military briefing techniques. Assigned to work in staff sections and to role-play a particular staff officer or commander, the cadets prepared their campaign analyses using primary and secondary sources. Cadets posted graphics of the operation on maps available in the classroom. During subsequent sessions each section briefed its results using the five-paragraph operations order format. Presentation blended the historical (what happened) with the doctrinal (what should have happened). Discussion centered around how well a particular task force executed its original plan or had to adapt it to existing circumstances. Throughout the three days of analysis the instructors brought in outside guests to provide a more realistic briefing setting and to offer critiques of the

Cadet staff group briefing a campaign analysis during the preliminary study phase.

cadets' effort. The preliminary study phase made the officers and cadets subject-matter experts before they embarked on the actual staff ride.

The second phase of the IAD, the field study phase, encompassed stops in CONUS and Panama. To provide cadets with a better understanding of the complex linkage between the strategic and operational levels of war, the group began its trip in Washington, D.C. Here the group attended briefings and seminars by key congressional staffers who detailed the strategic importance of the Panama Canal, congressional interest in the operation, and the difficulties encountered during national intelligence-gathering operations. Dr. Alan Pierce of the National War College gave an excellent presentation on the Joint Crisis Action System. As a sideline, the officers and cadets listened to a speech by Senator Sam Nunn on possible future roles and missions for the armed forces in support of domestic issues. The cadets left the capital newly aware of the lack of consensus among the speakers regarding the importance of Panama in U.S. foreign policy and the impact of JUST CAUSE on that country. They certainly gained greater understanding for the potential pitfalls that a president encounters when deciding to use a military option in pursuit of policy objectives.

The next two stops were also in CONUS and involved visits to some of the combat units that participated in the campaign. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 504th Infantry, sponsored the group's two-day visit. The group listened to briefings and viewed video footage on the 82d Airborne Division's organization, capabilities, and mission. On the morning of the second day, Lt. Col. Greg Gardner, the battalion commander, gave an excellent presentation on his unit's activities in Panama. Gardner himself served as S-3 (Operations), 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, during the campaign. Afterwards a group of veterans, ranging in rank from captain to sergeant, discussed their perceptions of the operation with the cadets. These junior leaders provided candid details and assessments of their unit's performance. Next, the Division Support Command guided the group through an extensive tour of the 82d Airborne's deployment sequence and outload facilities at Fort Bragg and nearby Pope Air Force Base. The capstone of this visit occurred as members of the staff ride witnessed an airborne operation from inside a C-141 aircraft.

The group next traveled to Fort Benning, Georgia, to talk to the 75th Ranger Regiment. The Rangers had formed Task Forces Red and Red-T to conduct forcible entries by parachute assault of Tocumen/Torrijos and Rio Hato airfields during the operation. The format for this portion of the staff ride was similar to that at Fort Bragg. After a series of briefings on Ranger capabilities and special operations missions, representatives of each Ranger battalion outlined their unit's actions to seize these key facilities. The cadets also had a lively discussion with Ranger veterans of the operation. After two days at the "Home of the Infantry," the group flew from Atlanta into Panama City to begin walking the actual battlefields.

United States Army, South (USARSO), sponsored the group when it arrived in Panama. Mrs. Delores DeMena, the command historian, acted as staff ride facilitator, guide, and translator. She worked out a demanding, but enjoyable, schedule of events which covered all aspects of the campaign. After introductory remarks by Maj. Gen. Richard Timmons, commanding general of USARSO, the group began its staff ride with a round of command briefings. Col. Michael Snell, former commander of the 193d Infantry Brigade, discussed the brigade's combat assaults in Panama City during JUST CAUSE. His comments hit home when the class moved to the battlefields.

The first day and a half of the staff ride concentrated on actions on the Pacific side of Panama. This included visits to objectives inside Panama City, such as the location of Noriega's former headquarters at the La Comandancia and Carcel Modelo Prison where special operations forces freed American Kurt Muse. The group then drove to Paitilla airfield to evaluate the Navy SEALs' actions to disable Noriega's personal plane to prevent its use in a possible escape. At Fort Amador the group walked around a housing area where the wives and children of some American officers hid while elements of Snell's brigade neutralized the PDF garrison. Only a parade ground separated the opposing sides during firefights. This portion of the staff ride highlighted the difficulties of urban combat and the need for restrictive rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage to populated areas.

The group traveled across the country on the second day to view Task Force Atlantic's objectives. Composed of elements of the 3d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division, and the 3d Battalion, 504th Infantry, Task Force Atlantic had responsibility for a number of objectives along the Panama Canal. At Gamboa the group explored a PDF barracks riddled with AT-4 and small arms fire. The damage that these weapons inflicted upon the building had a sobering effect on the cadets. The highlight of this day's activities was a trip to Coco Solo. There Company C, 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry, forced a PDF naval infantry company to surrender after employing a Vulcan in a firepower demonstration against its barracks. Panamanian Capt. Amadis Jimenez, who commanded that company, accompanied the group throughout their day on the Atlantic side. His poignant and emotional account of what happened to his command offered a rare glimpse into battle as seen through the enemy's eyes.

During the last day of the field study phase the group covered the actions of the 82d Airborne Division and Task Force Semper Fi. The 82d Airborne's air assaults into the mud flats around Panama Viejo and on to the heights of Cerro Tinajitas received particular scrutiny from the group. The officers and cadets discussed the fundamentals of building a roadblock when they viewed marine positions watching over the Bridge of the Americas. In an interesting reprise of a similar session held on the Atlantic side the previous day, staff ride participants joined in a group discussion with veterans of the operation at Fort Kobbe. The members of this group ranged in rank from colonel to specialist and represented all branches of the service. Most were very forthcoming about the strengths and weaknesses of their particular unit's performance in JUST CAUSE. Their comments were food for thought as the staff ride came to a close. With the exception of Fort Cimarron and Rio Hato, the group had visited all of the operation's major battlefields.

Throughout the staff ride instructors and cadets discussed not only what happened, but how a particular action could have been better executed. These informal integrative sessions reinforced doctrinal and tactical principles that the cadets had studied in the preliminary study phase. Mrs. DeMena arranged time and office space for the group to conduct a formal integration/after-action review session on the last day in Panama. The cadets discussed some of their findings with Brig. Gen. Joseph Kinzer, deputy commander of USARSO, during an outbriefing. The former assistant division commander for maneuver in the 82d Airborne Division during JUST CAUSE, Kinzer addressed several pertinent issues regarding command and control and the conduct of contingency operations with the staff ride participants. The staff ride formally concluded after a tour of Miraflores Locks and a briefing on the security arrangement for the canal. As they flew and drove back to West Point over the next two days, members reviewed what they had learned and debated the future likelihood of this type of contingency operations.

The Operation JUST CAUSE staff ride was a unique and rewarding experience that accomplished all of its goals. The combination of classroom studies, visits to deployed units, and actual battlefield tours gave the participants a feel for the connection between strategic ends, operational ways, and tactical means. The staff ride exposed the cadets to the complexities of rapid deployment planning and contingency operations that they will likely face in the future. Every participant gained insights into the intellectual, emotional, and physical challenges typical of such operations. The participants concluded the staff ride better armed to deal with similar future challenges during their professional careers.

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Grant, Meade, and Clausewitz
The Application of War as an Extension of Policy During the Vicksburg and Gettysburg Campaigns

Ronald K. Kyle, Jr.

Captain Kyle's paper won the Center's 1991 Military History Writing Contest. Due to funding limitations, there was no contest in 1992. Meanwhile, the emphasis on commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of World War II has delayed the publication of Captain Kyle's prizewinning essay until this issue.

Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum that "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means" was neither well known nor well appreciated by those who read his work in the years following its publication. (1) Today, however, it is a fundamental policy guiding the U.S. Army's approach to military operations. "All military operations pursue and are governed by political objectives," as the dictum is expressed currently in the Army's capstone manual on the operational art. (2) The principle is now both well known and, because of the necessary submission of military power to civilian authority in a democratic society, well appreciated.

The FM (Field Manual) 100-5, entitled simply *Operations*, is imbued with Clausewitzian thought. It restates much of Clausewitz more clearly than the original *On War* and incorporates insight gained from 150 additional years of history. It defines military strategy as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation...to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force." (3) Success in battles and campaigns is not in itself sufficient, for they are simply means to an end. Battles and campaigns must be fought to achieve political objectives. While this reality is not such an important consideration when leading platoons, companies, and battalions, it becomes more important when leading divisions and corps. At the highest echelons, it becomes a paramount consideration.

Leaders at the highest levels must pattern their military operations to achieve the political goals of the government they serve. If a military leader is successful in battle at the tactical or operational level but cannot create the opportunity to translate this success to achieve strategic goals, then he has failed to use his military forces to their proper end. He probably also has wasted lives and treasure. Conversely, if his military operations at the tactical and operational level translate into strategic success—no matter if they are in themselves successful—then he has properly served his soldiers and his government.

The Gettysburg and Vicksburg campaigns in the American Civil War illustrate these concepts well. Both occasions were important Union victories. Both took place in the late spring and early summer of 1863. Together, both constitute what is generally regarded as the turning point in the war. Gettysburg, however, although an important operational victory, contributed little toward the Union's political objectives of restoring the Union and abolishing slavery. The North inflicted more losses in men and materiel than the South could afford and repulsed the Confederate invasion of the North, thus discouraging European recognition of the Confederacy. Strategically, however, Gettysburg merely restored the situation that had existed before the battle: two large armies again faced each other in Virginia, each seeking to destroy the other and capture the opposing national capital.

Vicksburg, on the other hand, was both an important operational and strategic victory. It was an operational victory because Union forces captured a Confederate army and reduced a Confederate fortress. It was a strategic victory because it restored control of the Mississippi basin to the Union and freed the slaves within the conquered area. Union forces split the Confederacy in two and opened large areas to further invasion. To be sure, Gettysburg might have been an equally important—or even more important—strategic victory than Vicksburg, but the Union leadership at Gettysburg was unable to understand the political nature of the conflict. They lacked the vision to translate their operational successes into strategic success. The leaders at Vicksburg, on the other hand, understood well the political aspects of the war and fashioned their tactical and operational objectives to accomplish the Union's political goals.

Paradoxically, a great deal has been written about Gettysburg, while relatively little has been written about Vicksburg. Gettysburg captures the imagination. What began as a minor skirmish near an unimportant town became for three days a herculean struggle between each belligerent's largest army. The outcome of the battle was in doubt until the last afternoon. It took place in the Eastern Theater, which had the attention of the nation during the war and of historians ever since. Finally, there is Abraham Lincoln's famous Gettysburg Address, a

masterpiece of oration that has been forever etched into the American political consciousness. The Peach Orchard, Little Round Top, and Pickett's charge are familiar names even to those who know little U.S. history.

Vicksburg, however, was essentially a siege, and sieges inherently are less interesting when compared with battles involving even a modicum of maneuver. Although the movements of the Union forces in May 1863 are regarded by many as among the finest in warfare, they spent most of the campaign starving their Southern brothers out of the Vicksburg stronghold. (4) The campaign took place in the West, which did not hold the attention of most Americans then, or historians since. (5) The battles of Port Gibson, Raymond, and Champion Hill have been forgotten by all but military historians. Finally, there is no timeless expression similar to Lincoln's address at Gettysburg by which Vicksburg could have achieved everlasting fame in American history. As a result, most Americans regard Gettysburg as the more important battle, even as the *most* important battle of the Civil War.

It was at Vicksburg, however, much more so than at Gettysburg, that the Union Army threatened Confederate independence. Gettysburg was a Northern victory on Northern soil. Vicksburg was a Northern victory in Southern territory. Gettysburg prevented the South from "conquering a peace," but did nothing to threaten the Southern states directly. Vicksburg opened large portions of the Confederacy to direct attack. Gettysburg hurt a Confederate army; Vicksburg destroyed one. Gettysburg "supplied no long-range strategy for winning the war," whereas Vicksburg fulfilled a major Union strategic objective decided upon early in the war. (6)

In the months before Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac, the Union's principal army in the East, had suffered two devastating defeats at the hands of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Confederates' principal army in the East. The first was in December 1862 at Fredericksburg. The Union forces were commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, who had been in command only for one month. Burnside decided to cross the Rappahannock River to attack Fredericksburg because a road and a rail line ran from that city to Richmond, the Confederate capital. When Burnside attacked, Confederate General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, was waiting for him. The attack was a dismal failure. The Union army suffered almost 13,000 casualties; the Confederates almost 5,000. (7) In January 1863 President Lincoln replaced Burnside with Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.

Hooker developed a bold plan for breaking the stalemate in the East. In April 1863 he sent a large portion of his force to cross the Rappahannock west of their current position. He intended to turn Lee's position, to force him to fight at a disadvantage, and then to destroy his army. He crossed the river and proceeded to engage Lee in battle. At the Chancellorsville crossroads, he hesitated. Lee did not. Almost as if he sensed Hooker's doubts, Lee decided to strike first. In a brilliant display of generalship, Lee, in the face of superior numbers, divided his force to attack. He again divided his forces to turn Hooker's flank. From 2 through 4 May, Lee constantly kept Hooker off balance. In the end Hooker, more psychologically than physically beaten, withdrew north of the Rappahannock. The Army of Northern Virginia had again defeated the Army of the Potomac. The Union suffered the most casualties: 17,000 to 13,000 Confederate losses. The Confederacy, however, had lost a larger portion of its total forces. (8) Also, Confederate General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, Lee's right hand, was wounded and died shortly afterwards. Despite this last consolation, Union hopes were at a low ebb.

In the West, meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Union Army of the Tennessee, was trying several different approaches to reach the Confederate fortress of Vicksburg. By the winter of 1862 he had several options open to him. He knew that the most militarily sound approach would have been to "go back to Memphis; establish that as a base of supplies...and move from there along the line of railroad." But he knew he could not make his decision solely on a military basis. "The North had become very much discouraged," he wrote, and "many strong Union men believed the war must prove a failure." The midterm elections had gone against Lincoln's party, and Grant judged that "to make a backward movement as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted by many...as a defeat. There is nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory." (9)

With these considerations in mind, Grant developed a daring plan to move "by land below Vicksburg from which to operate." Because the waters of the Mississippi were unusually high, Grant would have to wait until they receded to implement his plan. (10) By April 1863 the waters had dropped sufficiently for Grant to proceed.

First he sent south the transport barges that he would require to shuttle his army across the Mississippi. Escorted by naval vessels, they floated past the Vicksburg batteries virtually unscathed. He then gave orders for his army to move south on the west side of the Mississippi River to where the barges waited. On 30 April he crossed the Mississippi in force. On 3 May—the same day that

Lee was running circles around Hooker at Chancellorsville—Grand Gulf, a small town not far south of Vicksburg, fell without much of a fight. Grant planned to use Grand Gulf as a base from which to operate against Vicksburg.

At this point, Grant changed his plan. He decided to "cut loose from [his] base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg and invest or capture the city." (11) Even Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, who would later make a name for himself using just such tactics, objected to the plan. He felt it would be impossible to supply the army under such circumstances. Sherman's argument was sound, and Grant respected it. Grant had previously experimented with the possibility of living off the countryside, and the results had surprised even him. (12) He knew that the army could not be supplied with all its rations; his plan was for his army to take all the rations they could "and make the country furnish the balance." (13) Whether he knew it or not, the countryside that he proposed to subsist off was richer than any conqueror had ever known. (14)

Grant's army headed northwest for Jackson, Mississippi, a Confederate state capital. Jackson, in addition to being politically significant, was also the most likely staging point for Confederate reinforcements. Moving quickly, Union forces won victories first at Raymond, then at Jackson. Turning back west toward Vicksburg, they won two more victories at Champion Hill and Black River Bridge. By 19 May 1863, Vicksburg was surrounded, and Grant had reestablished his supply lines. Grant then tried twice to storm the Vicksburg defenses. Both attempts failed. Unwilling to sustain any further losses, Grant decided to besiege the city.

Back in Richmond, General Lee proposed to Jefferson Davis, the Confederate president, an invasion of the North, attacking through Pennsylvania to Harrisburg or Philadelphia. After his brilliant victory at Chancellorsville, Lee had come to believe his army could do anything he asked of it. He hoped, among other things, that his attack into Union territory would force Grant to send reinforcements east, thus releasing Grant's hold on Vicksburg. Although Davis would have preferred to send reinforcements to the West, he accepted Lee's proposal. Again, the Army of Northern Virginia headed north, this time in search of what has been called the "decisive battle"—the one that would finally win the war for Southern independence. (15)

As they marched northward, the need for shoes became increasingly important. The Confederates believed some might be available in the small Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg. On 1 July 1863, units from the Union and Confederates forces met there. By the end of the day the Confederates controlled the town, but the Federals had taken up defensive positions on a ridge just south of Gettysburg. Reinforcements for both sides were on the way. The battle had been joined, but in a place neither side expected nor particularly wanted.

This time, there was a difference in the Army of the Potomac—General Hooker was no longer in command. Just three days before the battle, Lincoln had sacked Hooker, replacing him with Maj. Gen. George G. Meade. Meade reached the battlefield in the early hours of 2 July. Lee, aware for the last the last two days that he faced another Union commander, had been at Gettysburg for just over twelve hours. (16)

On the second day Lee decided to attack the flanks of Meade's army. Although the principal attack was on the Union left, Lee hoped that both flanks would collapse. Neither did, thanks to the gallant men of the 20th Maine on the left at Little Round Top and the 1st Minnesota on the right at Cemetery Hill. At a war council that evening, Meade expressed his belief to his commanders that Lee would now attack the Union center. He was correct.

On the third day Lee attempted to break the Federal lines in the center. General Longstreet's corps led the attack. In what has become known as Pickett's charge, the Confederate soldiers flung themselves against well-prepared Union forces. The fighting was ferocious, but by this time the outcome was fairly clear. The Federals repulsed the rebels. The point of their farthest advance has been dubbed "the high-water mark of the Confederacy." The Confederates fell back to their original lines and prepared for the Union counterattack.

With Meade's generals divided on the issue, the Union attack never came. One of his generals advised a quick counterstrike, while two others urged caution. They believed their army had done well to this point; they should not now risk defeat by repeating the same mistake General Lee had just made. There was no shortage of casualties from both sides lying on the battlefield. Both sides retired, each expecting the contest to continue the next day. (17)

The belligerents did not resume the fight on 4 July 1863—the day the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to General Grant. That evening Meade issued Order No. 68. He congratulated his soldiers "for the glorious result of the recent operations." He also informed them that the "task was not yet accomplished" and said he looked to the army "for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the...invader." (18)

That night Lee withdrew under cover of darkness, as the Federals discovered the next day. The battle really

was over. The cost had been high on both sides: 23,000 Union and 28,000 Confederate casualties. (19) The North could replace such losses; the South, however, could not. The Army of the Potomac had defeated the Army of Northern Virginia.

While this was happening in the East, surrender negotiations in the West had been proceeding between Grant and General John C. Pemberton, the commander of the Vicksburg garrison. Pemberton, a Northerner, decided that if he had to surrender eventually, he would do so on the Fourth of July to get the best terms possible. The Confederate fortress thus capitulated the day after the guns fell silent at Gettysburg. Word of the fall of Vicksburg reached Lincoln on 7 July. He now believed that the rebellion was on the verge of collapse. "If General Meade," he wrote to Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, his general in chief, "can complete his work...by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army the rebellion will be over." (20)

During the previous two years Lincoln had read a great deal about the military art and arguably was "as canny a strategist as the North possessed." (21) Although it is hardly certain that the South would have collapsed as quickly as Lincoln hoped, he correctly grasped the strategic situation: General Meade's work was not yet finished. Lincoln had not read Clausewitz, but "few historical figures understood the inner logic of [war as an extension of political policy] more clearly...than Abraham Lincoln." (22) He understood that the Union would not be restored simply by repulsing an invasion. He knew that merely halting an invasion would not free any slaves. He now believed that Meade should strike at Lee while he was weakened and still on the northern side of the Potomac River. In this way, the success gained at Gettysburg would assume strategic importance—it would be the battle that weakened Lee sufficiently for the Army of the Potomac to destroy him.

Lincoln already had written Halleck expressing his concern that Union actions did not seem aimed at preventing Lee's crossing and destroying him. He urged Halleck to get involved if necessary. (23) Halleck attempted to do just that. "You have given the enemy a stunning blow at Gettysburg," he telegraphed Meade, "give him another before he can cross the Potomac...if vigorously pressed he must suffer." Meade replied that although he would do all that was possible, his army was still recovering from Gettysburg and was stalled on the muddy roads. He also did not want to repeat Lee's mistake of charging well-prepared positions, this time with the Confederates on the defensive. (24)

On 9 July Meade's army again was on the move. He spent the next three days searching for a position from which to attack. Despite the certain knowledge that the rains had made the Potomac River unfordable and that, consequently, Lee was trapped on the northern side of the river, he waited. On 12 July, with the Potomac's waters falling, Meade himself was ready to attack, but five of his seven corps commanders wanted still more time to probe Lee's positions. (25) Meade let the vote of his war council decide his army's action—or rather, inaction—over his own judgment. When he finally advanced on 14 July, Lee was gone. "If the war was ever to be won, it would have to be won later—and somewhere else." (26)

Lincoln was profoundly disappointed, and Halleck passed these sentiments on to Meade. Meade responded by offering his resignation. Lincoln decided to explain the reason for his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the campaign to General Meade in a letter. Although he thanked Meade for all he had done at Gettysburg, Lincoln quickly got to the point:

I had been oppressed...since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that [you] were not seeking collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle....The case, summarily stated is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not...pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that [Lee] had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at leisure, without attacking him....

I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday [13 July], how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had at hand?... Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it. (27)

Although Lincoln decided not to send the letter (and did not accept Meade's offer to resign) we see that Lincoln, a man untrained in the art of high command, grasped the strategic situation better than the well-trained general

who actually faced it. (28) Because of Meade's failure, more treasure would need to be expended and more lives would have to be lost. The war would indeed continue.

Meade's failure to pursue and attack Lee was controversial in the years immediately following the Civil War. Writing several years later, Francis A. Walker believed that Meade showed "a proper resentment of the blame shown upon him for allowing the retreat of Lee," clearly indicating that such blame did take place. He also noted, however, that Meade "took little pains to vindicate himself against aspersion and disparagement." Fully supportive of Meade, Walker asserted that in deciding not to pursue Lee, Meade enjoyed the support of most of his immediate subordinates. Given the passage of time, Walker concludes, history would agree that Meade had been right regarding "his pursuit of Lee." (29)

It is clear, however, that Lincoln—and not Meade—had correctly grasped the situation; Meade should have been able to come to the same conclusions, given the intuitive ability to do so. Meade and Lincoln had the same information, but Meade could not (nor would he later) grasp the politics of this war as clearly Lincoln had. (30) The phrase Meade used in his Order No. 68, i.e., "to drive from our soil...the invader," had particularly goaded Lincoln, no doubt because the president regarded the war as being fought precisely because the whole country was Union soil. (31) Meade's use of this phrase demonstrates that he did not understand the larger context.

Some would argue in mitigation of Meade's inaction that he only recently had received the mantle of command. But that argument overlooks the fact that at no time during the remainder of the war did Meade exercise the initiative that, had it been present after Gettysburg, would have moved him to more aggressive action against Lee. It also overlooks Meade's certain knowledge that the Confederates would not be receiving reinforcements. (32) Finally, it overlooks Meade's disregard of the strong encouragement his superiors gave him to attack.

Although Meade's thoughts cannot be known for certain, the most likely cause of his hesitation was his respect for General Lee, "the one soldier in whom most of the higher officers of the Army of the Potomac had complete, undiluted confidence." (33) One of Meade's division commanders, captured on the first day at Gettysburg but then left behind by the retreating Confederates, passed word to Meade that he had overheard Confederate plans to fake a retreat. When the opportunity was ripe, they would attack. Meade believed Lee's past victories showed him to be dangerous, regardless of appearances. (34)

Campaigning with the Army of the Potomac almost a year later, Grant exploded at a Union officer who believed Lee was on the verge of defeating them again: "Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault and land in our rear and on both flanks at the same time. Go back to your command and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do!" (35) But this was 1863, not 1864, and Meade was in command, not Grant—and Meade was no Grant. The decision not to attack Lee north of the Potomac rests squarely with Meade. Despite his knowledge of the avowed war aims of the Union, he lacked the ability to understand the relationship between his actions as one who prosecuted the war at the highest levels and the policies for which he was purportedly fighting.

Viewed in this light, the Gettysburg campaign should be seen as a strategic draw; at best a minor strategic Union victory. Many would disagree with this and argue that Gettysburg was an important strategic Union victory because it prevented the South from winning the war. Although this view has merit, it overlooks other equally likely possibilities.

The first and most obvious is that the Army of the Potomac had been defeated on enemy territory many times, only to remain on the field as an effective fighting force. Unless Lee had totally annihilated Meade's army, an unlikely possibility, it would no doubt have recovered from yet another defeat—especially since it was in Northern territory. It would have continued to resist the invasion. Other battles probably would have followed. Union forces would have been operating on interior lines of communication and supply, while Lee continued to operate on exterior lines. Had the Confederates lost one of these battles in the same manner as they lost Gettysburg, they might have been too deep in Northern territory to return to Virginia safely.

Second, it ignores the convincing assumption that the war would continue so long as Lincoln was in power. Defeat at Gettysburg would have caused an increase in antiwar sentiment. The victories at Vicksburg and in Tennessee, however, probably would have allowed Lincoln to "swap queens," as it were, and to continue to prosecute the war.

Finally, it ignores the fact that Lee's strategy was based on a faulty premise—that this war could be won in a single decisive stroke. (36) The "great operational success" achieved by Lee's army caused the Confederacy to overlook the strategic realities this war presented. Although "Lee [dominated] the eastern theater, Union armies in the West battered in the door to the heartland of the Confederacy." (37) It was in the West,

not the East, that the war would be won or lost.

Fighting for the Union in the West was a general who, like Lincoln, had come to grasp much of the nature of this people's war. General Grant wrote in his autobiography that before the battle of Shiloh in April 1862, he believed "that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies." After the bloody two-day battle of Shiloh, he "gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest." (38) Grant was not the only general to see the results of the war's early battles and campaigns, yet he was almost alone in drawing the necessary conclusions from them. Most other generals clung tenaciously to old concepts, trying their best to make the war fit the parameters that they understood. The war did not oblige them.

When Grant undertook the Vicksburg campaign, he abandoned many of these traditional military concepts, such as the relationship between an army and its base of operations, a notion to which other generals continued their attachment, however inappropriate for the current struggle. (39) Grant tailored his operations to meet political requirements; he did not operate in a political vacum, as did many other generals in this war. He even chose the riskier military operation in his attempt to reach Vicksburg *because the easier and better military option of falling back to Memphis and then advancing with it as his supply base would have hindered the accomplishment of political objectives.*

If Gettysburg can be considered the turning point of the Civil War, it is only because Grant clearly won an important strategic victory at Vicksburg. The campaign was pursued successfully at every level. The Mississippi Basin, an important geographical center of gravity, fell to Union control. Slaves were freed. Southerners' hopes for independence were dimmed (one area to which the victory at Gettysburg *did* contribute). Finally, Lincoln had found the general he had been looking for and had not until this point identified—one who was not afraid to fight; one who was not afraid to take chances; one who saw the war and the methods necessary to prosecute it successfully much as he did. If the fall of Vicksburg was not itself inherently more important than Gettysburg, Grant's emergence was the only addition necessary to make it so.

Grant soon rose to command all the Union armies and to provide the leadership the armies needed to win the war. Although Grant, like Lincoln, had not read Clausewitz, in his own way he put many of Clausewitz's maxims into practice. (40) Because he did so, he was the most successful and, arguably, the most able general on either side in the American Civil War.

The Army's leaders today need to remember much of what Grant learned during the war. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the American forces during Operation DESERT STORM, looked to Grant and Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman (a Grant protege and his most able lieutenant) as two of his role models. In an operation where political considerations again were paramount, there were numerous constraints and restraints on U.S. military forces. General Schwarzkopf employed his forces to ensure that any military operations undertaken would advance—or at least, not hinder—the coalition force's political objectives. Many operations that would have yielded a clear military advantage were not carried out because they would have been detrimental to the stated goals of U.S. policy.

Clausewitz would have been pleased.

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Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport, trans. J. J. Graham (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 119.
2. Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 9.
4. Archer Jones believes it to be one of the finest strategic turning movements in the history of warfare. See "Technological Change and Doctrinal Stability, 1815-1914," in *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 413. J.F.C. Fuller quotes F.V. Greene as saying (in *The Mississippi*, 1909, pp. 170-71) "we must go back to the campaigns of Napoleon to find equally brilliant results accomplished in the same space of time with such small loss." J.F.C. Fuller, "The Siege

of Vicksburg and the Battle of Chattanooga, 1863," in *A Military History of the Western World* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1956), vol. 3, p. 68. Finally, Civil War historian James M. McPherson states that "military historians almost universally regard [the Vicksburg Campaign] as the most brilliant and innovative...of the Civil War." Mc Pherson, "Ulysses S. Grant's Final Victory," *Military History Quarterly* 2, no. 4 (Summer 1990):102.

5. Some historians have charged that the Eastern campaigns have been studied in great detail, while the Western campaigns largely have been neglected. See, for example, Williamson Murray, "What Took the North So Long?" *Military History Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (Summer 1989):26.

6. Russell F. Weigley, "A Strategy of Annihilation: U.S. Grant and the Union," in *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 138. Lincoln declared at a strategy meeting in early 1862 that once New Orleans was captured it would also be necessary "to proceed at once toward Vicksburg, which is the key to all that country watered by the Mississippi and its tributaries....The Confederacy...can still defy us from Vicksburg [which] is the key....The war can never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket." David Martin, *The Vicksburg Campaign*, The Great Military Campaigns of the Civil War, (New York: Wieser and Wieser, 1990), pp. 7, 10.

7. James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), p. 572.

8. Timothy H. Donovan, Jr., et al., *The American Civil War*, The West Point Military History Series, ed. Thomas E. Griess (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1987), p. 142.

9. Ulysses S. Grant, *Memoirs and Selected Letters*, eds. Mary Drake McFeely and William S. McFeely (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1990), pp. 295-96.

10. Ibid., pp. 305-06. Civil War historian Bruce Catton suggests, however, that Grant's plan was not nearly so well developed as Grant seems to suggest here. Catton, *Grant Moves South* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 400.

11. Grant, *Memoirs*, p. 328.

12. John Keegan, "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," in *The Mask of Command* (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 219.

13. Grant, *Memoirs*, p. 328.

14. Keegan, "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," p. 219.

15. Williamson Murray, "Napoleon's Flawed Legacy," *Military History Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1989):101.

16. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative, Fredericksburg to Meridian* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), p. 462.

17. Ibid., pp. 574-77.

18. Ibid., p. 587. Bruce Catton puts this order as occurring "a few days after Gettysburg." Lincoln, however, in a letter of 6 July 1863 to Henry W. Halleck makes reference to a previous discussion over the phrase in the order, "Drive the invaders from our soil." Therefore Foote, placing the reading of this order on 4 July, seems more likely to be correct. See Catton, *Glory Road*, in *Bruce Catton's Civil War: Three Volumes in One* (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1984), p. 420, and Abraham Lincoln, *Speeches and Writings 1859-1865*, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1989), p. 474.

19. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom*, p. 664.

20. Ltr, Lincoln to Halleck, 7 Jul 63, in *Speeches*, p. 475.

21. Catton, *Glory Road*, p. 419.

22. Charles Strozier, "The Tragedy of Unconditional Surrender," *Military History Quarterly* 2, no. 3 (Spring 1990):12.

23. Ltr, Lincoln to Halleck, 6 Jul 63, in *Speeches*, p. 474.

24. Quoted in Foote, *The Civil War*, p. 589.

25. Ibid., p. 591.

26. Catton, *Glory Road*, p. 419.

27. Ltr, Lincoln to Meade, 14 Jul 63, in *Speeches*, pp. 478-79.

28. Catton, *Glory Road*, p. 420.

29. Francis A. Walker, "Meade at Gettysburg," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (Secaucus, N.J.: Castle), pp. 407, 412.

30. Keegan, "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," p. 192.

31. Ltr, Lincoln to Halleck, 6 Jul 63, in *Speeches*, p. 474.

32. Bruce Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox*, in *Bruce Catton's Civil War: Three Volumes in One* (New York: The Fairfax Press, 1984), p. 465.

33. Ibid., p. 485.

34. Foote, *The Civil War*, p. 587.

35. Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant*, pp. 69-70, quoted in Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox*, p. 513.

36. Murray, "Napoleon's Flawed Legacy," pp. 100-101; Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World*, p. 48.

37. Murray, "Napoleon's Flawed Legacy," p. 100.

38. Grant, *Memoirs*, p. 246.

39. Keegan, "Grant and Unheroic Leadership," pp. 192, 215-18, 220.

40. Murray, "What Took the North So Long?" p. 27.

1944

January - March

2 Jan - The 126th Infantry and other elements of the 32d Infantry Division make an amphibious landing at Saidor, New Guinea, against very light opposition. Of the 6,602 Army troops who land, casualties are 1 soldier killed and 5 wounded.

3 Jan - The 1st Special Service Force launches an assault toward Monte Majo, high ground overlooking the town of Cervaro, Italy. The attack marks the beginning of a II Corps attempt to reach the Rapido-Garigliano River line.

6 Jan - The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, captures San Vittore, Italy, following a fierce house-to-house battle.

- The 6th Armored Infantry captures Monte Porchia.

- President Franklin D. Roosevelt tells Congress that the United States has contributed $18,608,000,000 to the Allies through Lend-Lease programs.

9 Jan - The 1st Special Service Force (augmented by two battalions of the 133d Infantry) completes the capture of Monte Majo.

12 Jan - The 168th Infantry captures Cervaro following air and artillery bombardment of the town.

16 Jan - Elements of the 34th and 36th Infantry Divisions launch an assault on Monte Trocchio, thought to be the last enemy stronghold east of the Rapido. However, the assaulting troops discover that the Germans have withdrawn across the river. The way is now open for a drive on Cassino to keep the Germans there occupied and to draw additional German troops from the vicinity of Rome, thereby assisting the planned amphibious landing at Anzio.

20 Jan - The War Department announces that total Army casualties in the war to date are 106,320. Of that number 17,018 are killed, 39,658 wounded, 24,229 missing, and 25,415 taken prisoner.

- General Ddwwight D. Eisenhower goes to Buckingham Palace for an audience with King George VI.

20-21 Jan - Hoping to enter the Liri River valley and advance to the Anzio beachhead, the 36th Division attempts a night crossing of the Rapido River south of Sant'Angelo. The assault is mounted against some of the strongest German defenses along the Gustav Line, and by dawn only scattered troops are on the west bank of the river. By the end of 22 January, following a failed attempt to expand the shallow bridgehead, the river crossing is abandoned.

22 Jan - The Allies achieve complete surprise in an amphibious assault along the beaches near Anzio. The VI Corps lands 36,000 men and 3,200 vehicles between 0200 and the following midnight.

25 Jan - The 133d Infantry of the 34th Division crosses the Rapido north of Cassino.

29 Jan - The 168th Infantry and 756th Tank Battalion cross the Rapido and capture high ground which will enable the 133d Infantry to take Monte Villa from which it can launch an assault on Cassino.

30 Jan - Following eight days of reinforcing the Anzio beachhead, VI Corps opens an attack to expand the beachhead. On the corps left, the British 1st Division captures Campoleone, but on the right the 3d Infantry Division's attack toward Cisterna is stopped. Two battalions of the Ranger Force, spearheading the 3d Infantry Division's assault, are especially hard hit: 761 of the 767 Rangers are killed or captured.

- Elements of the 168th Infantry capture the village of Cairo, Italy.

31 Jan - Elements of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and Company B, 111th Infantry, occupy Carter and Cecil Islands in the Kwajalein Atoll. Elements of the 17th Infantry occupy Carlson and Carlos Islands in the same atoll.

1 Feb - Following a massive naval, air, and artillery bombardment, the 184th and 32d Infantry, supported by tanks of the 767th Tank Battalion and Company A, 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, make assault landings on Kwajalein Island.

Chronology

- The 168th Infantry occupies Monte Castellone. The 142d Infantry occupies Mass Manna.

2 Feb - The 133d Infantry captures Monte Villa.

- Chauncey Island in the Kwajalein Atoll is captured by the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop.

3 Feb - Elements of the 133d Infantry, supported by five tanks, reach the edge of Cassino and begin bitter street fighting. Unable to maintain their positions, they withdraw the next morning.

- The 17th Infantry lands on Burton Island in the Kwajalein Atoll, completing the capture the next day.

4 Feb - The Germans counterattack against the VI Corps at Anzio.

- Japanese resistance ends on Kwajalein Island.

- President Roosevelt signs a bill authorizing payments of from $100 to $300 to veterans upon separation from military service.

8 Feb - The II Corps launches an attack on Cassino and Monte Cassino. Seven days of intense fighting produce few results, with the 133d Infantry still limited to a small section of northeast Cassino.

15 Feb - The sixth-century Benedictine monastery on Monte Cassino is destroyed by Allied bombers and artillery in preparation for an attempt by Indian and New Zealand troops to break through the Gustav Line into the Liri valley. The Germans hold their line against the attack.

16 Feb - The Germans mount a major counterattack against the Anzio beachhead in an attempt to eliminate it. Although heavy casualties are sustained by both sides over the next two weeks, the battle eventually results in a stalemate which lasts through March.

18 Feb - The 22d Marine Regiment captures Engebi Island, opening the U.S. assaults to take Eniwetok Atoll.

19 Feb - 1st and 3d Battalions, 106th Infantry, conduct an assault landing on Eniwetok Island.

21 Feb - Eniwetok Island is secured.

22 Feb - Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas is relieved of command of the VI Corps. He is replaced by Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.

- The 22d Marine Regiment, supported by tanks of the 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, captures Parry Island, Eniwetok Atoll. By 23 February American troops have complete control of the atoll.

29 Feb - Elements of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, invade Los Negros Island, one of the Admiralties. The Momote airstrip is captured but must be voluntarily relinquished because the invasion was staged as a reconnaissance in force and there are not enough men to establish a beachhead that includes the airstrip within the defensive perimeter.

2 Mar - The 1st and 2d Squadrons, 5th Cavalry, capture the Momote airstrip.

9 Mar - The Japanese open a counterattack against the American beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. By 23 March the counterattack will end in failure.

12 Mar - The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, lands on the Admiralties island of Hauwei, completing the capture the next day. This small island was taken to serve as an artillery base in support of the upcoming invasion of Manus Island.

15 Mar - Following one of the most intense air and artillery bombardments of the war so far, Indian and New Zealand troops attempt to take Cassino. On 23 March the failed attack is called off.

- The 2d Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, makes an assault landing on Manus, largest of the Admiralty Islands.

17 Mar - An airstrip is captured on Manus near the village of Lorengau. This airstrip, and the one at Momote on Los Negros, are the primary strategic objectives of the operations in the Admiralties.

18 Mar - Lorengau is captured by the 2d Squadron, 8th Cavalry.

This chronology was prepared by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

Historical Work During World War II

Stetson Conn

(Part one of three parts)

In 1980 Dr. Stetson Conn, the coauthor of The War of the American Revolution *and* The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, *produced* Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954, *also published by the Center of Military History, but far less well known than Doctor Conn's other works. What follows is the first of three excerpts from Chapter 4, Historical Work During World War II.* Army History *will serialize that chapter—less endnotes—as well as Chapter 5, Launching THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, in the next six issues.*

On 11 December 1941, the day that the United States and Germany exchanged declarations of war, General Spaulding [Brig. Gen. Oliver L. Spaulding, Jr.] recommended redefining the duties of the Historical Section, Army War College. "For the period of the present war" he wanted the section to become the depository for all Army records of historical value that had ceased to be live files, these files to be arranged to ensure "ready accessibility, ultimate publication, and final transfer to the Adjutant General as permanent custodian." He added that no historical writing of any kind on World War II was contemplated, and that except for the new responsibility for acquiring records the functions of the Historical Section should remain unchanged.

On reflection the Historical Section changed its position in respect to the inactive World War II records. The plan approved by the War Department the following March called for retiring all such materials to the Adjutant General for permanent custody, the same procedure followed since 1922 for World War I records. Representatives of the Historical Section would then develop a card index of papers of historical value, in a manner similar to the handling of World War I documents. In practice this function remained purely theoretical until the establishment in 1943 of a new Army historical office dealing with World War II. The volume of records turned in to the Adjutant General before that event was simply too small to warrant any systematic cataloging.

Meanwhile the section itself, without specific authorization, undertook a new function when it began the compilation of a World War II chronology for reference purposes. The chronology, dated from 7 December 1941, consisted primarily of clippings from the *New York Times*, with an index. It continued to be compiled until 1 March 1946, and was extensively used in answering official and public inquiries.

A more challenging function for the section began in early 1942, in response to requests from War Department agencies for information about the handling of particular matters in past wars, and especially in World War I, that might throw useful light on solving similar current problems. These requests resulted in a series of special studies. The first of them, on "Deficiencies in Transportation, 1917-1918," was completed on 6 March 1942. Four of the first seven requests for studies came from the office of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Exchanges between General Spaulding and the Chief of Staff's office in June and July formalized this special studies program, and by early August the Historical Section had received forty-six requests for studies on various subjects. The studies were prepared by one or more senior officers diverted from their other duties and normally took two weeks or longer to complete. Based as much as possible on readily available secondary materials, they were intended to be strictly factual in content. The bulk of the sixty-two such studies undertaken during the war was completed during 1942 and 1943.

As the war progressed, an increasing number of inquiries on military matters of all kinds poured into the Historical Section. A total of 10,520 requests from War Department agencies were received during the first ten months of 1943; in contrast only 713 had come in in the corresponding months of the preceding year. Most of them could be handled quickly by telephone, but others generated official communications (about 500 annually by 1943). The Historical Section continued during World War II to be the arbiter on all unit history matters, and inquiries from troop units about their history increased in volume from 506 in 1941 to 18,133 in 1944. Until April 1943 the section exercised its assigned responsibility for determining battle participation credits for World War II actions indirectly through a Battle Participation Board. At that time the General Staff's Personnel Division (G-1) took this function away from the section and vested it in the Adjutant General's Office. Later it was exercised directly by G-1 itself.

These service functions of the Historical Section in support of the Army's World War II effort, together with

the responsibility added to them of supervising World War II administrative history work in other Army historical agencies presently to be described, made relatively minor inroads on the section's continuing work on World War I projects. This work was naturally slowed in October 1942 when the Adjutant General moved World War I operational records to a warehouse in High Point, North Carolina, to provide more space for offices in Washington. A year or so later the records were brought back to Washington and put into the National Archives building. In early 1943 the Historical Section was itself moved from the Armory to the Army War College, still some distance from the records. Keeping one of its warrant officers at High Point and, later, two at the Archives, helped bridge the gap. When the records returned to Washington, it became customary for officers working on them to spend much of their time in the Archives. Despite the concentration during most of the war of three-fourths or more of the section's manpower on the World War I documentary and order of battle projects, they were far from complete when the fighting ended in 1945. Only about a quarter of the operational documents and maps were nearing readiness for printing, only token work had been done on the overseas supply documents, and the domestic order of battle volume (which became two thick books when printed in 1949) was a year or more away from completion.

The Historical Section grew to a strength of about fifty during the war. In January 1945 the breakdown was twenty-eight military and twenty-two civilian employees. All of the senior officers were retired men recalled to active duty; General Spaulding, who turned seventy in 1945, was by no means the oldest. Officers continued to do most of the professional work. Only one civilian, Mr. [Robert S.] Thomas, attained true professional status. A number of the men recalled were not properly qualified, for Spaulding had no voice in their selection. As a result, Mr. Thomas later recorded, "much time was lost and labor mis-spent." The section was able to provide the Army with satisfactory historical services during the war, and carry on its World War I work despite somewhat adverse circumstances. On the other hand, as constituted it was not really qualified to give vigorous leadership to the Army's historical work on World War II.

The strongest impetus to that work came from a letter of 4 March 1942 that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was prompted to sign, proposing the establishment of a scholarly committee to oversee the production by federal agencies of "an accurate and objective account of our present war experience." By this action the President formally endorsed work begun six months earlier in the Bureau of the Budget under Dr. E. Pendleton Herring, who was on leave from Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration. This work now expanded in civilian agencies with the objective of "assembly and analysis of the administrative developments in each of the major fields of war administration exclusive of the strictly military."

To secure appropriate coverage of the "strictly military" administrative developments, Dr. Herring turned to the military departments. At the suggestion of one of his recent graduate students, Lt. Col. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., then an assistant in the Chief of Staff's office, Herring approached Assistant Secretary McCloy and obtained his support. As requested by McCloy's office General Spaulding submitted a plan for the preparation of administrative histories "by each bureau or other office of the War Department, as may be designated by the Secretary." But, after staffing, the plan was applied only to the new major commands that had been created in the War Department reorganization of March 1942—Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), and the Services of Supply (SOS), later redesignated Army Service Forces (ASF). The plan, promulgated on 15 July 1942, called for appointment of historical officers with the necessary staffs in each command to prepare narrative histories of activities both of their headquarters and of their subordinate organizations, "to insure complete coverage of administrative events of historical significance." The Historical Section, Army War College, was designated the "advisory and coordinating office" and given the authority to fix standards for selecting material and methods of documentation. These new responsibilities did not require any change in the section's organization or other duties. Beyond circulating two advisory memorandums on procedures, until the following spring General Spaulding's office did little to control the work undertaken within the major commands.

Some of that work had already begun without any prompting from the Bureau of the Budget or Army Headquarters. A Medical Department historical office had been established in August 1941. Under its very able chief, Brig. Gen. Albert G. Love, this office laid the groundwork for the multi-volume *History of the United States Medical Department in World War II*. In May 1942 the Quartermaster General established an Historical Section in his office that would set high standards for professionalism and accomplishment. Ten days before being formally directed to do so the Services of Supply selected Maj. John D. Millett—in peacetime, a Columbia University Professor of Public Administration—as its Historical Officer. Before the end of 1942 nine other

elements of the service command had begun historical programs. Much of the work undertaken within the Services of Supply could be construed as coming within the framework of the administrative histories directed by the War Department under the program initiated by the President and the Bureau of the Budget. This situation did not hold as well for the programs undertaken by the Army Air and Army Ground Forces. The Air Forces program began with the appointment of Col. Clarence B. Lober as its Historical Officer in September 1942, and soon expanded its horizons to include Army air activities overseas as well as at home. The Army Ground Forces program had its start on 15 October 1942 with the appointment of Maj. Kent Roberts Greenfield—until recently chairman of the History Department at Johns Hopkins University—as Historical Officer. Greenfield likewise developed an interest in events overseas. The principal mission of the Ground Forces Command was the training of troops and the development of tactical doctrine, and the ultimate proving ground was in the overseas theaters.

As a preliminary step the Ground Forces historian made a careful survey of his own projected task and of other developments under the War Department's 15 July directive. He found general agreement, except from General Spaulding, that meaningful World War II coverage must include operations as well as administration. Everyone agreed it should also include individuals and organizations in the War Department Secretariat and General Staff involved in decision-making. Spaulding contended that combat history should not be written before official determinations on battle participation had been made and all relevant records, including those of the enemy, were secured in unclassified form. Greenfield and others agreed that definitive or official histories of military operations could not be written until after the war was over, but contended that it was important to prepare first narratives based on all available records regardless of classification for current restricted use and as groundwork for a future definitive history of the war.

In November 1942, eleven days after the Allied invasion of North Africa, the G-2 of the European Theater raised the question of historical coverage in his area, at least to the extent of indexing and cataloging the records of historical significance in his headquarters. Spaulding recommended appointing historical officers at overseas headquarters to prepare synopses of important documents on cards that would then be forwarded to the Historical Section in Washington for later use when the records had been retired to the Adjutant General's custody. This was approximately the same system that had been followed since 1929 for the World War I documentary project. He opposed preparation of any narrative historical studies on operations as premature. Noting that as of December 1942 about forty officers were engaged in World War II administrative history work on the home front, he implied that appointment of historical officers overseas would not be inconsistent. Spaulding's recommendations and guidelines for overseas wound up in the powerful Operations Division, through which all proposed overseas activities had to be cleared. That division, in presenting the matter to the Deputy Chief of Staff for decision, with Spaulding's consent, enlarged the proposal to include records of units in home commands as well as those overseas. But it refused to allot additional officers to historical duties exclusively, insisting that at each echelon an historical officer be assigned to do the records work "in addition to his other duties," a provision that did not promise much effective work.

Before these recommendations were acted upon, Spaulding submitted another proposal to improve World War II historical coverage, suggesting that an historical office be established in the General Staff to perform the same functions being undertaken in the major commands, thereby closing the major decision-making gap at the top noted in the Greenfield survey. Otherwise the gulf in viewpoints and actions between Spaulding's section and the new World War II historical offices in the major commands would widen. This fact was underlined by a dinner conference on World War II military history staged by Dr. Herring on 29 January 1943. The Archivist of the United States, the Librarian of Congress, Navy and Marine Corps historians, and thirteen Army representatives, including Col. Otto Nelson, the historical officers of the major commands, and historians from subordinate service organizations attended. No one from the Historical Section, Army War College, was present. As an outside observer noted at about this time, rather clearly the Army had no overall control its World War II historical activities.

After General Spaulding's proposals for a limited expansion of the Army's World War II historical work reached Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Otto Nelson for consideration, he developed new recommendations of a very different character. He believed the Army needed a new organization and system for "writing a history of American war operations" comparable to that established by the British. The Navy, Nelson said, had commissioned an "outstanding historian from Harvard University" (Samuel Eliot Morison) to handle their program and he suggested the Army should likewise select "outstanding individuals as key men in the project."

New Training and Doctrine Command Publication

The Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has published a new volume we would like to call to our readers' attention. One of the TRADOC Historical Studies Series, *Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1993*, by John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman is part of TRADOC's twentieth anniversary commemoration. Although not a definitive history, this study is an effective overview of how TRADOC began and how the command organized and operated through twenty years of strategic reorientation, from the midst of the Cold War to DESERT STORM and beyond. 248 pp., including appendixes, index, and suggested additional reading. Interested readers should contact the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (ATTN: ATMH), Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-5026, commercial (804) 727-3781, DSN 680-3781, DSN FAX 680-2504.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

These key men would "organize a system of writing a history of our military operations which will provide a first narrative and a proper documentation of sources." The new organization, Nelson suggested, should be in either the Intelligence or Operations Division of the General Staff or in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Over the initials of his superior he put these thoughts into a draft memorandum of 20 February 1943 which was circulated to the General Staff for comment. He also discussed his ideas with Mr. McCloy, and found him intensely interested. The Chief of G-2, in approving Nelson's recommendations, urged that the new office be put under the Assistant Secretary of War. Before acting McCloy sought the advice of several scholars in uniform. In conference with them on 23 April he tentatively decided that preparatory work should begin immediately for a large-scale operational history of the war to be written later, and that, in the meantime, smaller studies on particular operations should be written while the war was in progress. McCloy consulted separately with General Spaulding, who appears to have agreed that this work should be undertaken in the General Staff with assistance as required from the Historical Section. McCloy then also decided that the new office should be located in G-2 and he persuaded his senior military colleagues to agree. As a result, Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney on 30 April 1943 directed G-2 to establish a new historical office "to plan and supervise the compilation of the military history of the Second World War." Its purview was to include not only planning and supervision of preparation of "first narrative" histories of operations, but also coordination and supervision of administrative histories in the War Department. The new organization would also be responsible for overseeing the establishment of historical offices in the overseas theaters, for determining the methods to be used in accumulating the necessary documentation, for the dissemination of information concerning current operations as an aid to training, and finally for "the determination of functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Historical Section, Army War College."

While the new departures in Army historical work were still under consideration General Spaulding had appointed a full-time liaison officer to improve coordination of the administrative history program and, coincidentally, he circulated a new advisory letter to the major commands. In this communication and elsewhere he made it clear that coordination to him meant "consultation, advice, and suggestion but not the exercise of authority nor the issuance of instructions." He cautioned his liaison man to take great care on visits "not to give any impression that you are inspecting or interfering." Spaulding also emphasized that his Historical Section had no responsibility for coordinating anything but strictly administrative history, although he agreed that commanding generals were free to prescribe broader areas for historical investigation. It did not take Spaulding's liaison officer long to discover that "the whole question of Army historical work" on World War II seemed to be getting "more and more involved and unsatisfactory." He advised that "perhaps the only satisfactory procedure is to try to reorganize the whole situation from the beginning," and recommended a new central historical authority to exercise firm control over all World War II history work. He believed this work should include an operational history similar to the Navy's; and he and others in the Historical Section appear to have preferred a new and separate organization to the assignment of these func-

tions to the Historical Section, Army War College. These views throw some light on General Spaulding's relatively moderate reactions to the McNarney directive of 30 April and to later developments based on it.

In G-2, action on the directive went to Lt. Col. John M. Kemper, a thirty-year-old graduate of the Military Academy. More recently, while teaching history at the academy, he had been a junior colleague of Otto Nelson and had acquired a master's degree in history from Columbia. In discussions with Nelson, Kemper soon discovered that McCloy was adamant about putting the projected history office under G-2, although he agreed that "if not entirely satisfactory" it might be transferred elsewhere at a later date. And although "administratively and organizationally" it was to be a part of G-2 he conceded that it should "report directly to the Assistant Secretary of War for instructions." While it was generally recognized that the historical and intelligence functions had little in common, McCloy's decision was not an arbitrary one. Traditionally, in the absence of separate historical officers or offices in the field, history had been handled through G-2 (as in France in the summer and fall of 1918); both the Air and Ground Forces historical organizations had been established under their G-2s; and only G-2 had the network extending into the theaters that would make immediate historical work on Army operations possible. As suggested by Colonel Kemper, McCloy also agreed to appoint a planning committee to advise on the structure of the new organization and the scope of its work.

The planning committee became known as the Historical Advisory Committee after its formal appointment by and initial meeting with Assistant Secretary McCloy on 28 May 1943. The committee consisted of three civilian and three military members. James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College, then serving in Washington as Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Services, was selected by Mr. McCloy to be the committee's chairman. The other members were Dr. Herring, Prof. Henry Steele Commager of Columbia University, Col. Thomas D. Stamps, who handled military history work at West Point as head of the Department of Military Art and Engineering, General Spaulding, and Colonel Kemper, who acted initially as secretary. The Advisory Committee met six times in less than one month, and consulted with existing Army historical organizations, with those of the Navy and Marine Corps, with the Librarian of Congress, with the president and secretary of the American Historical Association, and with other eminent historians. The committee apparently gave serious consideration to a proposal for transferring the existing Historical Section from its nominal Army War College connection to the War Department Secretariat or General Staff, and adding to it about twenty people to handle World War II historical matters. In the end it rejected this idea and, in its report to Assistant Secretary McCloy on 26 June, recommended that a new Historical Branch be established in G-2 to "plan and supervise the compilation of the military history of the Second World War," that its chief be a senior officer in the grade of brigadier general, that he be assisted by a civilian Chief Historian to be engaged at the top (P-8) Civil Service grade, and that the committee itself continue to advise these officials on the manning and work of the new office. As Chief Historian the committee proposed Mr. Henry F. Pringle, a Columbia University Professor of Journalism and well-known biographer, who until recently had been with the Publications Division of the Office of War Information.

Mr. McCloy promptly approved the committee's recommendations although he wanted to talk with Mr. Pringle before his final selection and be consulted in the choice of a general officer to head the new branch. When none of the senior men proposed by G-2 for the chief's job proved acceptable to both Mr. McCloy and Colonel Nelson, Colonel Kemper suddenly found himself nominated for the position by default. Everyone approved. G-2 then formally established the Historical Branch on 20 July 1943 and designated Colonel Kemper as its chief. On 3 August the War Department informed the Army at large of this action by circulating a detailed directive to the new office that echoed in abbreviated form the June recommendations of the Advisory Committee.

The directive made the branch responsible for supervising or undertaking all Army historical work relating to World War II, for determining the functions and responsibilities of the Historical Section of the Army War College, and for final editing and approval of all historical manuscripts prepared for publication by Army agencies. Work on World War II was to take six forms: brief monographs on individual military operations; more comprehensive theater and campaign histories; administrative histories; a general popular history (wanted particularly by McCloy); an official history; and, ultimately, the publication of documents. The directive also made the branch responsible for establishing and manning historical organizations in the theaters and prescribing how they should go about their work, and for superintending the accumulation of the documents that would be needed for the official history to be written after the war. It assigned broad functions to the Chief Historian, including "such historical writing as is in harmony with his

other duties"; and it gave a more official standing to the Advisory Committee, of which Colonel Kemper now became a member *ex officio.* Although it stated that members were to be appointed by the Assistant Secretary of War, it made no mention of the branch reporting to him directly for instructions, as specified by McCloy the preceding May. Nevertheless he continued to consider the branch his creation, writing some two years later, "I started the Historical Section."

The directive to the Historical Branch, G-2, was strong, comprehensive, and flexible. A contemporary commentator described it as a "block-buster." He pointed out that the new branch had been given absolute power over all Army historical publications and that the manner of its creation had changed the course of Army history work in several other vital ways: it required the writing of operational histories, forbidden in the Army since 1929; it centralized the direction and supervision of all Army historical work, superseding the Historical Section, Army War College, as the primary supervisory agency; and it extended authority for historical coverage to every element of the Army from its headquarters downward.—*To be continued.*

Manuscripts Invited

The Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) has expanded its educational program to identify, discuss, and influence the outcome of significant defense issues that affect the U.S. Army. To carry out this charter, the AUSA Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) has established a program of research projects, publication of research papers and books, and sponsorship of defense-related conferences and symposia.

To allow for more direct participation in the public debate of significant defense-related issues, ILW is sponsoring three writing programs. The submission of quality manuscripts in encouraged.

Land Warfare Papers. This program is an outlet for research papers on defense and national security. The program's objective is to inform and influence opinion on defense matters.

Papers must be original and unpublished and should be in the range of 5,000 to 10,000 words. Accompanying charts and drawings must be reproducible in black and white. A one-page synopsis of the paper and a one-page biography of the author must accompany the manuscript.

Papers are reviewed by an editorial board for overall quality, scholarship, and the significance of the subject matter. The author of a paper selected for publication will receive an appropriate honorarium and be a candidate to present the paper at the AUSA Annual Meeting held in October. To be eligible for presentation, manuscripts must be received at AUSA by 31 July of each year.

Land Power Essay Series. The series is designed to provide an outlet for original essays on topics that will stimulate professional discussion and further public understanding of the land power aspects of national security. Essays should be no more than 2,000 words.

AUSA-ILW Books. AUSA-ILW books are published on a wide range of defense-related topics in cooperation with Brassey's (US), Inc. AUSA books, as well as other books in the Brassey's catalog, are sold at a 20 percent discount to AUSA members. Topics include history, policy issues, tactics, and other defense-related subjects of professional interest.

Manuscripts should be book length. Accompanying pictures and charts can be in black and white or in color. Manuscripts are reviewed by an AUSA-ILW editorial board and the publisher's editorial board for overall quality, readability, and the significance of the subject matter. Royalties are negotiated between the author and the publisher.

In addition to original books, reprints of texts of enduring value to the military profession are also published. Recommendations of books for reprinting are welcome.

Manuscripts should be forwarded to AUSA Institute of Land Warfare, ATTN: ILW Writing Program, 2425 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201. For additional information, write ILW or call (800) 336-4570 or (703) 841-4300, extension 320.

The German Army's Operation *LÜTTICH*
A 1944 Approach to an AirLand Battle Strategy

Mark Edmond Clark

During the 1980s the Army introduced the AirLand Battle into its doctrinal thinking. In essence, AirLand Battle is a counteroffensive strategy characterized by two central features. The first is the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA). FOFA has three main aspects: deep attack by ground forces into the flanks and rear of an attacking enemy; the integration of ground and air actions; and the use of new, high-technology weapons to attack the enemy's secondary echelons. The second feature is the use of concealment, surprise, initiative, and—especially—maneuver.

These two central ideas certainly are not new considerations for the student of operational art. When they are combined as operational requirements of the latest Army doctrine, however, their utilization becomes revolutionary.

During World War II the German Army had several opportunities to conduct counteroffensive operations against the Allies. Although German commanders possessed a thorough understanding of deep attack and maneuver and used them successfully, they never planned or conducted operations as extensive as those required by current U.S. Army doctrine. Through a study of counteroffensive strategy used by the German Army during World War II, a comparison is possible between what could be considered the Germans' standard deep attack and maneuver tactics and those required by operations according to the AirLand Battle strategy. One German operation in particular provides an excellent example for comparison, their 1944 counterattack at Mortain, France, known as Operation *LÜTTICH*.

This paper is a brief examination of that earlier operation from the perspective of current U.S. Army doctrine. It evaluates the decisions and actions taken by the German force's commander against those which might have been taken if the AirLand Battle strategy had been considered. Operation JUST CAUSE and Operation DESERT STORM proved that American commanders are expert in applying AirLand Battle concepts. The history of Operation *LÜTTICH* proves that mastering the requisite thinking and actions for the conduct of operations according to such a strategy is no small accomplishment.

After they secured a lodgment in Normandy, Allied forces sought to break out rapidly, driving into the Continent. In Operations GOODWOOD on 18 July 1944 and BLUECOAT on 20 July, the British fixed the attention of the German High Command in the west on the left flank of the Allied line. This established ideal conditions for Operation COBRA, the U.S. Army's attack on the right flank, which began on 25 July. By 31 July the German High Command in the west became aware of the threat posed by COBRA and sought to take appropriate counteraction. In response to his generals' pleas, Adolf Hitler ordered the creation of plans for an operation to cut off the American advance.

The means that Hitler envisioned to achieve this goal was a bold plan, typical of his preoccupation with offensive action. (1) According to his scenario, strong German units would continue to hold the line in the northern sector against the British. Meanwhile, an armored force would counterattack through American units to Avranches, near the coast, where the lines of supply and roads for follow-on forces of the U.S. Third Army, which was moving into Brittany, were bottlenecked. (2) After cutting off the Third Army, the force would turn northeast, against the U.S. First Army, and neutralize the American breakout. (3)

This plan is similar in nature to one that might be developed under current U.S. Army doctrine. German forces sought to delay, disrupt, and divert selected American units by attacking those target elements at choke points in terrain that would yield the desired effect. Such action could have developed opportunities for decisive action by reducing the enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority, thereby permitting German forces to gain the initiative. Preventing the U.S. Army from reinforcing its committed elements in Brittany, even temporarily, might have allowed the German forces to defeat it piecemeal.

Hitler's plan, however, far exceeded anything envisioned by the German Supreme Commander in the West, Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge. Kluge did not believe that he could amass a sufficient number of units to carry out a counteroffensive with any prospect of success. (4) He would have been content to drive to Avranches, cut off the U.S. Third Army in Brittany, keep it isolated while destroying its units, and continue on the defensive in Normandy while covering a German with-

drawal behind the Seine River. (5) Despite his serious reservations, Kluge developed a plan based on Hitler's concept.

Kluge was comfortable with the idea of taking the defensive and was reluctant to continue the battle on the offensive. Still, in many ways his plan was compatible with current U.S. Army doctrine. His operation was conceived with a follow-through firmly in mind, and specific provisions were made for the resolute exploitation of opportunities that might be created by tactical success.

After four days in preparation, the plan for Operation *LÜTTICH* was unveiled by Kluge's staff. At 1000 on 6 August, three armored divisions would attack abreast U.S. lines. In the north, the *116th Panzer* was to advance along the north bank of the See River toward Cherence. In the center, the *2d Panzer* would move along the south bank of the river. Meanwhile, in the south, the *2d SS Panzer*, reinforced by the *17th SS Panzer Grenadier*, was to attack on both sides of Mortain. (6) Behind them, a fourth armored division (*1st SS Panzer*) was to exploit the initial success by passing through the front line and taking Avranches. (7) German units fighting in the north would protect the attacking force's flank by holding the line against advances by British units.

To ensure concealment, the attacking force would move at night and under the cover of fog. Moreover, to improve the Germans' chances of achieving surprise, the attack would begin without the benefit of artillery preparation.

Hitler promised that the counterattack would be reinforced by all available reserves. He directed armored and infantry divisions from the south of France and the Pas de Calais to the Mortain area. (8) More important, the *Luftwaffe*'s reserve—some three hundred fighters—was committed in support. (9) The attacking divisions were led by General der Panzertruppen Hans Freiherr von Funck, but because of the gravity of the situation, Kluge himself would direct the entire operation.

As the starting date for the counterattack arrived, Kluge decided to delay for twenty-four hours because the promised reserve divisions had not arrived in the area. Kluge was convinced that the plan had no chance of success without those reserves. At the same time he was reluctant to order a delay, for with every passing hour the U.S. Third Army was driving deeper along his exposed southern flank, increasing the danger to his vulnerable rear areas. (10) Kluge was even more concerned that the Allies were becoming aware of the German concentration of forces. (11)

In 1974 it became clear that Kluge's suspicion that the Allies knew of the concentration of divisions was well founded. The Allies had intercepted German communications through the use of ULTRA, thanks to the decryption service at Bletchley, England. (12) Once alerted, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th U.S. Army Group, managed to realign the divisions of the U.S. First Army to ensure that a counterattack would run into a solid wall of resistance just beyond its starting point.

Three divisions of the First Army, the 3d Armored and the 4th and 30th Infantry, had been fighting their way southward during the first week of August. On the evening of 6 August they were disposed on both sides of the See River, down which the German divisions planned to drive on Avranches. The 3d Armored and the 4th Infantry Divisions were placed on the north bank and the 30th Infantry Division on the south, in and around Mortain. The 2d Armored Division was en route to provide support. (13)

It is important for a commander to consider and understand his opponent's strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. The movements of the American divisions proved Kluge's intuition correct, yet they did not affect his decision making. After Kluge realized that the promised reserves would not arrive in a reasonable time, he decided not to delay further and launched the counterattack. (14) Although it achieved initial success, the entire operation ended in failure.

On 7 August, the *2d SS Panzer*, reinforced by the *17th SS Panzer Grenadier*, advanced quickly on Mortain and took the town. Continuing toward the high ground around St. Hillaire, the German force gave the impression that it might even reach Avranches. It ran into trouble, however, in the region of Hill 317, a knot of high ground east of Mortain that was held by a small American force that directed heavy artillery fire against the advancing Germans. (15)

The *2d Panzer*, in the center, advanced quickly toward Juvigny, but eventually ran into heavy resistance from the divisions of the U.S. First Army, positioned on both sides of the See River.

In the north, the *116th Panzer* was scheduled to advance toward Cherences, but at first it failed to attack through lack of motivation on the part of its commander, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf von Schwerin. One of the participants in the plot against Hitler, Schwerin did not see any chance of victory against the Allies and refused to commit his division. He was relieved of his command, to be replaced by Funck's chief of staff, Col. Walter Reinhard. (16) The division then began its advance but became bogged down almost immediately.

The promised *Luftwaffe* air support never material-

ized. Allied air forces destroyed the fighters before the ground attack began. The situation for the German airmen was so poor that by the end of the day on 8 August all they could do was dig in against the Allied artillery and air assaults.

The attacks by the German divisions were made across the front—a typical approach in armored warfare during World War II. As a result, Kluge could not achieve a deep penetration and, subsequently, exploit the U.S. forces' rear areas. Much as is required under current U.S. Army doctrine, he could have sought ways to outflank and bypass American defenses. General Bradley admitted afterward that "had the enemy side-stepped his *Panzers* several thousand yards south, he might have broken through to Avranches on the very first day." (17)

Kluge may not have been able to match firepower with U.S. forces, but he could have tried to establish combat ratios favorable to him at decisive points. Proper positioning of forces in relation to the enemy frequently can achieve results that otherwise could be achieved only at a heavy cost in men and materiel.

Further, perhaps Kluge could have seized opportunities to create confusion in the U.S. command. When mobility is used with the goal of confusing an enemy commander, it translates into maneuver. Achieving such a goal would not have been very difficult because the German counterattack already had caused great anxiety among the American leaders. When General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander, saw the opportunity to counter the attacking German force by repositioning some U.S. divisions in the south, he hesitated. To do so would have reduced support for the U.S. 30th Infantry Division at Mortain. (18) If the 30th Infantry could not hold, the results would have been devastating. The corridor of supply and follow-on forces to the south would have been cut off, and the U.S. Third Army would have had to return northward to open it—and that would have been interpreted as a defeat for U.S. forces. (19)

To a certain extent, Kluge had already made strides in achieving the goal of creating confusion in the U.S. command by using concealment and surprise in the initial stages of the counterattack. In addition, however, he could have begun aggressive movements and positionings to confuse the U.S. command about his intentions. He might have been able to force the American commanders to react, not act, and thereby restrict their freedom of action.

Once it was clear that the operation had failed, Hitler ordered a second counterattack. It was planned for 10 August and would make use of armored divisions that were fighting the British. However, General Heinrich Eberbach, who was ordered to execute the plan, did not believe that sufficient reinforcement would be available for such an action until 20 August, and the entire operation was canceled.

Clearly, the decisions made and actions taken by Kluge during Operation *LÜTTICH* were unsatisfactory in the light of AirLand Battle strategic thinking. Granted, Kluge's force was much weaker than the U.S. force that opposed it, but his tactics guaranteed a heavy loss of men and materiel with little hope for success.

No doubt, the German force's ability to fight effectively during Operation *LÜTTICH* would have been enhanced greatly if Kluge could have used concepts similar to those of the AirLand Battle strategy. The AirLand Battle scenario is designed to provide an army with the means to fight outnumbered and win. The strategy cannot be applied, however, to the operation of any army's units at the will of a commander. The AirLand Battle strategy must be introduced into an army's doctrine well in advance. It requires special equipment and training and the specific organization of formations. It must be instilled at all levels.

Today, the U.S. Army is equipped, trained, and organized to carry out the AirLand Battle strategy. Officers must continually prepare themselves to fight according to it through field training exercises, classroom studies in the command and staff school system, personal studies in military history, and all other activities that may stimulate thought on the current doctrine. In this way, they will enhance their chance for success in applying the AirLand Battle strategy to their future operations.

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Notes

1. John Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1969), p. 51.
2. Ibid.; Russell Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 157.
3. David Mason, *Breakout: Drive to the Seine* (New

York: Ballantine Books, 1968), p. 92.
4. Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods*, p. 51.
5. Ibid.
6. Mason, *Breakout*, p. 93.
7. Ibid.; At the operational level, logistics governs what can and cannot be achieved. The operational commander must base his plan on the logistics immediately available in the theater of operations. See Clayton Newell, "Logistical Art," *Parameters* 19 (March 1989): 34. Although the subject has not been elaborated upon in my sources, I believe that logistics did not pose a great problem for Kluge. According to John Keegan, Kluge possessed *Operativ*, defined in the German Army as the exceptional ability to convert plans on paper to action in the field. Thus, Kluge could easily manipulate the logistical support that was present in order to meet operational requirements. See John Keegan, *Six Armies in Normandy* (New York: Viking, 1982), p. 243.
8. Mason, *Breakout*, p. 93.
9. Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods*, p. 51; Keegan, *Six Armies*, p. 245. The *Luftwaffe* air support was supposed to suppress Allied air superiority and protect the armored divisions from fighter-bomber attacks, but the Allied air forces were too strong. If properly used, the *Luftwaffe* was still capable of another important role—air interdiction. At Mortain the Allies fully understood the role that air power could serve in delaying and disrupting an opponent's mobility while enhancing that of the friendly ground force. See Price Bingham, "Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art," *Parameters* 19 (March 1989): 22.
10. Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods*, p. 51.
11. Ibid.; Keegan, *Six Armies*, p. 245.
12. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, p. 197.
13. Keegan, *Six Armies*, p. 246.
14. Ibid.; Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods*, p. 51. Although the four German armored divisions faced only two U.S. infantry divisions and one U.S. armored division, they were greatly outmatched and outnumbered. The German divisions had at best 190 tanks among them, while the U.S. 3d Armored Division alone had 250. See Mason, *Breakout*, p. 93; Robert Stern, *SS Armor* (Carrollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal, 1987), p. 67.
15. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, pp. 198-99.
16. Mason, *Breakout*, p. 23.
17. Ibid.
18. Eisenhower, *The Bitter Woods*, p. 53.
19. Ibid.

New World War I Medal Available

The Department of Veterans Affairs has asked that we include the following news release in Army History:

The nation is mustering its World War I veterans one last time to honor them with a special medal commemorating their wartime service on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armistice that ended "the war to end all wars."

The medal is intended for every living U.S. veteran of World War I, estimated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) at between 30,000 and 40,000.

Designed by the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, the medal is sponsored by the Chicago-based McCormick Tribune Foundation and is being presented to veterans under the auspices of the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs.

Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown said, "It is fitting that we honor these World War I veterans whose service and sacrifice had such a profound effect on world history. But it is particularly fitting that we can extend this special honor on the 75th anniversary of that war's end."

The first medals were presented at ceremonies in Chicago on 30 August, during the annual convention of the Veterans of World War I of the U.S.A. VA will distribute the medal to veterans beginning in September 1993. Officials hope to have the bulk of the medals distributed by Veterans Day, 11 November 1993, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armistice that ended World War I.

To receive the medal, World War I veterans or their representatives can obtain an application from the nearest VA regional office or call toll free 1-800-827-1000.

Call for Papers

Old Dominion University, the General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, and the Douglas MacArthur Memorial are co-sponsoring a special symposium on the fiftieth anniversary of General MacArthur's return to the Philippines in 1944. This symposium on World War II is scheduled to be held at the MacArthur Memorial Museum in Norfolk, Va., 20-22 October 1944, and will focus on such topics as:

* Strategic Decisions
* FDR, King, and MacArthur
* MacArthur's Australian Allies
* Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
* SWPA Intelligence Activities
* Guerrilla Operations in the Philippines
* Invasion: The Liberation of the Philippines
* Operations (General Military Campaign)
* The Effects of MacArthur's Return

Travel and hotel expenses may be provided for some independent or foreign scholars whose papers are accepted for presentation. Time allocated for each paper will be twenty minutes. It is anticipated that twenty to twenty-five presenters plus an additional eight commentators will be accepted.

A reception and dinner with guest speaker will be held the evening of the first day.

The deadline for submission of a 600- to 800-word proposal with current *curriculum vitae* is 1 February 1994. For further information, please contact Dr. W. Preston Burton, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. Telephone (804) 441-2965, FAX (804) 441-5389.

New Naval History Publication on DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

Dr. Dean C. Allard, Director, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., would like to call our readers' attention to one of its new publications. *United States Naval Forces in Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Select Bibliography* was compiled by Comdr. R. A. Brown, USNR, and Dr. Robert J. Schneller. This bibliography contains over five hundred entries and is divided into five sections: finding aids, source materials, books, articles, and videos.

For further information, contact the Naval Historical Center, Building 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374-0571.

A.G. Fisch

Letters to the Editor

Mark E. Hubbs responds to Thomas E. Miller's criticism (in Letters to the Editor, Army History *no. 26) of Mr. Hubbs' article, "A Pandemonium of Torture and Despair," (*Army History, *no. 24).*

Dear Mr. Miller:

This is in response to your letter to the editor of *Army History* in which you "picked a bone" with my article entitled "A Pandemonium of Torture and Despair." I regret to say that I found the tone of your letter rather defensive and, if I may, I would like to address your concerns in detail.

1. Shiloh and your displeasure with the term "driven." As Shiloh was only mentioned in passing during the introduction of this article, I was somewhat surprised that this upset you. During the time I was an employee of Shiloh National Military Park, I had the opportunity to study the terrain, primary sources, and site artifacts of the battle that few other people are privileged to enjoy. I believe that I have a firm understanding of the battle's prosecution and significance, and that my knowledge of the battle far exceeds that of the average Civil War historian. Regardless of the gains made by the Confederate forces on Sunday, Monday's fight found the Southerners in retreat. Your suggestion that "driven" implies disorganization or rout is incorrect. Although the Confederate Army did begin to resemble a mob by the time it reached Corinth twenty miles away (as evidenced by the stragglers and discarded equipment littered behind them), the retreat formally was not a rout. They were, however, driven from the field at Shiloh as Webster defines to "drive"—"to repulse, remove, or cause to go by force, authority, or influence." I believe that is an accurate term for any military force who loses ground to its foe. After all, Confederate forces did not abandon the woods and fields around Pittsburgh Landing because they chose to. Grant and Buell's men drove them out!

I fear that you may be suffering from the same "Shiloh Lost Victory Syndrome" that I and others have had at times. No matter what was accomplished on 6 April and no matter what the odds against them were on 7 April, the Confederate Army was not in possession of the field after the battle. As Bruce Catton wrote: "On paper Shiloh was a draw: actually it was one of the decisive battles of the war. It was a battle that the Confederates simply had to win....It had failed and the fact that it had come close to being a dazzling victory did not offset that failure."

2. My use of the term "rebel." When writing about the Civil War, or any other military history, one has a limited number of nouns and adjectives available to apply to the forces who fought for either side. To improve readability and prevent repetition one should not use the same term too many times. I referred to military forces from Southern states twenty-one times in the text. I used the term "rebel" five of those times and "Confederate" or "Southern" the remainder. I do not believe those five instances are overwhelming. I also do not feel that the term "rebel" is derogatory, or that it detracts from the patriotism, loyalty, or devotion that these men felt for their new nation. I have read many postwar sources in which Confederate veterans refer to themselves as "rebels." In another sense, the official U.S. Government name for the Civil War is the "War of the Rebellion." Thus, those taking part in the rebellion could properly be labeled "rebels."

3. The author's "anti-Southern" bias. As to your third concern, did it ever occur to you why I wrote about an obscure battle on the White River in Arkansas? It is because I was born and raised in that area of the proud southern state of Arkansas! If I have any bias, I am certain that it is not of a sectional nature. I had four great-great-grandfathers and at least ten uncles of various "greats" who served in the Confederate Army. One of these men, in the 20th Tennessee Infantry, witnessed Albert S. Johnston waving his famous tin cup at the Peach Orchard at Shiloh. Another, in the 15th Arkansas Infantry, was wounded in Rea's Field in the same battle. The importance of my Southern heritage in shaping my character is second only to my faith in God.

I am a defender of my historical rights as a Southerner and detest those who would attempt to squash our collective Confederate memory by banning our flags and emblems. I detest equally those who attempt to alter history and maintain myths of the Old South for southern benefit. Some members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, of which I am a former member, are guilty of this. Their storybook, "Gone With the Wind" view of Southern history is as reprehensible as the "Uncle Tom's Cabin" stereotype that some *true* anti-Southerners espouse.

I assure you, Mr. Miller, that any bias I maintain is not of an anti-Southern nature. If one exists at all, it is neither Southern nor Northern, but rather Union. It is a bias toward the same Union and Constitution that, as an Army officer, I swore to protect and defend.

Mark E. Hubbs

Book Review
by John T. Greenwood

The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 3, *"The Right Man for the Job," December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943
Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, eds.
Johns Hopkins University Press. 772 pp., $45.00

This third volume of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, "The Right Man for the Job,"* covers the first eighteen months of the U.S. involvement in World War II. The volume includes 632 official and personal documents, all but 3 of them personally drafted or dictated by General George C. Marshall, the wartime chief of staff of the War Department. The editors' interconnecting narrative provides the necessary context for the documents, and their numerous explanatory footnotes add specific details about each document.

The collection contains many documents addressed to President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Secretary of War Henry Stimson; Marshall's colleagues on the Joint Chiefs and Combined Chiefs of Staff, such as Admirals William Leahy and Ernest King, General Henry H. Arnold, and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke; and to the American theater and ground commanders, such as Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower, Joseph Stilwell, and Douglas MacArthur. Of course, all of the major Allied and U.S. decisions and operations from Pearl Harbor through the end of the Tunisian campaign in May 1943 are covered, including the Philippines campaign of 1941-42, planning for cross-Channel operations, Operation TORCH and the invasion of North Africa, the operations of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the buildup of Army Ground and Air Forces in the United States and overseas, and so forth.

However, as is usual with such published collections of papers, this is a one-sided collection—the incoming letters, memorandums, messages, etc., to which many of the Marshall documents directly reply or refer are not included. Unfortunately, users of such collections have had to become used to these practices. Although the editors usually note the location of the referenced correspondence, even that will not ease the burden for most researchers who lack direct access to the files of the Marshall Library or the National Archives. This situation will be eased for those who already possess or have access to the five-volume set, *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years*, because they will be able to retrace both sides of the extensive exchanges between Marshall and Eisenhower during this critical early period of the war.

Despite this problem, the volume contains valuable information of George Marshall's thoughts and actions, his views on American and Allied strategy, his relationships with his civilian and military colleagues, and much more. *"The Right Man for the Job"* provides the documentary volume that complements the wartime volumes of Forrest Pogue's biography of General Marshall *(Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942*, and *Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945)*. For Army historians interested in understanding the complex issues that George Marshall, the War Department, and the Allies faced and solved during World War II, this collection is a very useful reference tool.

Dr. John T. Greenwood is Director, Field and International Programs, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Book Review
by J. Britt McCarley

Last Train from Atlanta
by Adolph A. Hoehling
Stackpole Books. 558 pp., $16.95

First published in 1958 and now available in paperback reprint, Adolph Hoehling's *Last Train from Atlanta* is a "camera eye" (p. 15) documentary of the Civil War siege of Atlanta. Drawing on primary sources (diaries, memoirs, and newspaper accounts), the decidedly antiwar Hoehling intrudes seldom in the text and puts his material together chronologically to carry the reader from early July 1864, when Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman began moving his armies directly against Atlanta, to the departure of Sherman's troops from the city's ruins to begin the March to the Sea. The result, according to Hoehling, is a "recital of the little things that transpire in a city under siege." (p. 18)

The book's daily entries focus on the stories of individuals. Hoehling's best material consistently comes from and concerns civilians. The first Union projectile fell on Atlanta on 20 July, killing a young girl who had been walking with her parents. When Atlantan Er Lawshe, standing nearby as the shell exploded, reached the girl, she lay face down "in a welling puddle of blood." (p. 113) The unnamed girl was only the first of many civilians to die.

Following the 22 July battle of Atlanta, Confederate surgeons worked feverishly to save their wounded.

Atlanta writer Wallace P. Reed, one of the few civilians with the stomach to watch the grisly proceedings, recalled that the "green grass took on a blood-red hue, and as the surgeon's saw crunched through the bones of the unfortunates, hundreds of gory arms and legs were thrown into the baskets prepared to receive them." (p. 131)

After the late July series of battles near the city still left it in Confederate hands, Sherman began a formal siege of Atlanta, which lasted the better part of a month. Meanwhile, many of the city's civilians remained inside the embattled fortress. During one sultry evening, a local family sat outside their house enjoying the night air as best they could. Predictably, Federal artillery fired into the city, and one round landed uncomfortably close by. Everyone scrambled for the family's underground bomb-proof, save the only male in the group, the "colonel" (of course!), who declared: "Pshaw! I am not going to stay down here this hot night. I'll go up to my room and finish reading [appropriately] the *Life of Napoleon*, and if there is any real danger I will come down to you." (p. 171) During the continued shelling, one projectile all but destroyed the wing of the house in which the colonel had been reading his biography. Suddenly, out of the resulting sulphurous smoke, according to Wallace Reed, "something very much like a singed cat, only much bigger, rolled down into their midst, and sat up with a sneeze.... It was the colonel!" (p. 172)

Although Atlantans adjusted fairly well to the worsening conditions of the siege, civilian casualties mounted as operations continued into August. Again, Wallace Reed recalled 9 August as "that red day...when all the fires of hell, and all the thunders of the universe seemed to be blazing and roaring over Atlanta." (p. 279) "It was on this day of horrors, that the destruction of human life was greatest among the citizens." (p. 280) The round-the-clock Federal artillery bombardment spared neither the living nor the dead from its turbulence. The Atlanta *Daily Intelligencer* reorded for 12 August that "whilst the sexton was engaged in burying the body of one of Mr. Crew's family, the enemy furiously shelled the funeral party whilst it remained in the cemetery. No one was hurt, but the monuments and gravestones were very much broken." (pp. 295-96)

After inconclusive siege operations and failed cavalry raids against Atlanta's remaining railroad supply lines, Sherman used his infantry to cut those routes in late August and early September. On 1 September the Confederates made arrangements to leave Atlanta. These plans included setting fire to twenty-eight ammunition-laden boxcars on the Georgia Railroad. Teenager Mary Rawson recorded floridly the resulting explosions on the night of 1-2 September: "...sleep and dreams were soon interrupted by rapid and loud explosions. On arising a most beautiful spectacle greeted our sight. The Heavens were in a perfect glow while the atmosphere seemed full of flaming rockets, crash follows crash and the swift moving locomotives were rent in pieces and the never tiring metallic horse lay powerless while the sparks filled the air with innumerable spangles." (p. 408) The chaos that accompanied the Confederate withdrawal from the city brought out the inevitable looters and riffraff, some wearing gray uniforms. Wallace Reed remembered that Atlanta then was "almost in a state of anarchy." (p. 400)

On the morning of 2 September, Mayor James Calhoun and a small party of community leaders surrendered the city to Union forces with these words: "Sir—the fortunes of war have placed...Atlanta in your hands. As Mayor of the city, I ask protection for noncombatants and private property." (p. 418)

Those noncombatants, Atlanta's remaining civilians, waited fearfully for occupation by the victorious Union Army. There was some initial bad behavior by Sherman's bluecoats. Atlanta child Carrie Berry remembered that a few soldiers "did act ridiculous, breaking open stores and robbing them." (p. 422) Overall, though, she continued, "they were orderly and behaved very well. I think I shall like the Yankees." (p. 422) Union sergeant Rufus Mead asserted that "our boys...on the whole behaved very well so I hear all the citizens affirm; much better than their own men." (p. 459)

After about ten weeks of occupying Atlanta, Sherman began preparing for a pared-down combination of the forces he had led against the city to march through Georgia to the port of Savannah. Sherman ordered his engineers to destroy those portions of Atlanta, primarily buildings, that still had military value to the Confederacy. Most of the work of destruction took place during the night of 14-15 November. Maj. Ward Nichols, Sherman's aide-de-camp, remembered is as a "grand and awful spectacle—this beautiful city now in flames. The heaven is one expanse of lurid fire; the air filled with flying, burning cinders; buildings covering two hundred acres are in flames; every instant there is a sharp detonation or the smothered booming sound of exploding shells and powder concealed in the buildings, and then the sparks and flame shoot away up into the back red roof [of the sky], scattering cinders far and wide." (pp. 533-34) To Carrie Berry, one of the few civilians left in Atlanta, the memory of the burning was vivid: "Oh what a night!

They came burning the store house...it looked like the whole town was on fire. We all set up all night. If we had not set up our house would have been burnt up, for the fire was very near, and the soldiers were going around setting houses on fire where they were not watched. They behaved very badly." (p. 537) When daylight returned, about one-third of the city lay in ashes.

On 16 November Sherman and his few remaining corps finally marched out of Atlanta and headed for the Atlantic coast. Gazing back upon the city as he left, Sherman recalled that "behind us lay Altanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like a pall over the ruined city." (p. 540)

There are pluses and minuses to Hoehling's *Last Train from Atlanta*. First the pluses. Naturally, the book's original strengths carry over to the reprint. Hoehling's compilation of period sources provides rich raw material from which to gain especially good insights into the fate of Atlanta, its citizens, and the soldiers on both sides during that pivotal summer of 1864. It also gives the reader a refreshing break from the often clinical analyses of this and other American military campaigns. The touching insights contained in the recollections of Atlantans Carrie Berry and Wallace Reed are particularly good in this regard.

The book's shortcomings also inhere from the 1958 edition. Beyond a dogged adherence to chronology, there is no further organization to the book—into any day's story, all the accounts that pertain to it are strung end to end. Moreover, neither the original nor the reprint has an index. The reader must laboriously pull together, for example, all the remembrances of Berry or Reed, page by page. Stackpole Books could have greatly improved the utility of the reprint by constructing an index, which no doubt would have added to the price, but which would have been money well spent. On balance, though, this book has far more going for it than not.

Dr. J. Britt McCarley, a native Atlantan, is the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) historian. His master's thesis details Sherman's logistics during the Atlanta campaign, and he has published a guide to the city's major Civil War battlefields.

Forthcoming in *Army History...*

Dr. Brooks Kleber's recollections of springtime in Bavaria—as a prisoner of war during World War II.

The annual index for the last four issues of *Army History*.

Book review by Stanley L. Falk of *Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of the American POWs in Burma, 1942-1945*.

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